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I can't reconcile the sight of a battered child with the belief that we
choose what happens to us, that we create our own world.
-Gloria Anzaldfza 1
Rights are under attack. Some conservatives criticize the expansion of
rights for lacking a legitimate basis, for contributing to adversariness and
social conflict, or for undermining respect for law. Some left-leaning
scholars criticize rights because they are incoherent and indeterminate, or
because they fail to promote community and responsibility. Whatever the
reason, rights criticism abounds.
A rather obvious historical observation might explain the current popu-
larity of rights criticism. Legal and political reforms in the last few de-
cades have successfully established new rights based upon race, gender,
environment, age, and handicap, and many legal scholars disapprove of
these directions of change. On the other hand, the actual articulation and
enforcement of these rights in specific contexts has disappointed those who
seek more significant changes. Perhaps, more subtly, the visions of human
relationships implied by newly recognized rights disturb and disappoint
both those who have faith in traditional cultural forms and those who
have hopes for as yet unrealized alternatives. Once rights are perceived as
vulnerable to attack, they are widely perceived as inadequate.
One contemporary development in legal scholarship that offers a re-
sponse to each of these critiques of rights describes law's method as "inter-
pretation." As a theory of judicial action, this interpretive turn no doubt
owes a debt to similar developments in theories of social science, literary
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criticism, philosophy, and theology.2 In law, scholars of many political
stripes join in the interpretive turn.' Perhaps the idiom of interpretation is
capacious enough to permit replication of longstanding legal debates over
the purposes and nature of law and judicial action." I defend here a par-
ticular version of the interpretive turn in law, the version depicting law as
a communal language and attaching law to the social contexts in which
norms can be generated and given meaning.
I also defend a version of interpretation that struggles with and against
established patterns of power and authority.5 In my view, efforts to create
2. See, e.g., R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS,
AND PRAXIS (1983) (social theory); M. BUBER, BET EEN MAN AND MAN (1959) (theology); T.
EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY (1983) (literary theory); S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS
CLASS? (1980) (same); C. GEERTZ, THE LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983) (anthropology); T. KUHN, THE
ESSENTIAL TENSION (1977) (philosophy of science); P. RICOEUER, INTERPRETATION THEORY
(1976) (philosophy); R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); P. WINCH,
THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY (1958) (social theory); see also
R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPrON, HABrrs OF THE HEART: INDI-
VIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) (sociologists adopting interpretive ap-
proach); D. LACAPRA, HISTORY & CRITICISM (1985) (discussing debate among historians about
interpretation); R. LEVINS & R. LEWONTIN, THE DIALECTICAL BIOLOGIST 273-88 (1985) (explor-
ing ideologies of biological theories and proposing dialectical approach emphasizing relationships both
among parts that compose whole and between observer and observed); Bell, The Turn to Interpreta-
tion: An Introduction, 51 PARTISAN REV. 215, 218 (1984) (introducing symposium on interpretive
turn which "signifies the turn of the social sciences-or of those practitioners of this art-from the
models of the natural sciences and their modes of inquiry, to the humanities"); Papke, Neo-Marxists,
Nietzscheans, and New Critics: The Voices of the Contemporary Law and Literature Discourse, 1985
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 883 (reviewing J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984)).
3. See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982);
Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 373 (1982); Weisberg, A Response to Fish and White, 5 Miss. C.L. REV. 57 (1984); White,
Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
684 (1985); see also McIntosh, Legal Hermeneutics: A Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 1
(1982) (evaluating interpretive turn in legal theory); Patterson, Interpretation in Law-Toward a
Reconstruction of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1984) (same); Phelps & Pitts, Ques-
tioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological Hermeneutics for Legal Interpretation, 29
ST. Louis U.L.J. 353 (1985) (same). Although some scholars emphasize the multiplicity of meanings
in legal texts, the multiple notions of the interpretive enterprise, and the search for certainty as itself a
symptom of our "collective disorder," Levinson, On Dworkin, Kennedy, and Ely: Decoding the Legal
Past, 51 PARTISAN REV. 248, 262 (1984), two newcomers to the enterprise, Charles Fried and Rich-
ard Posner, emphasize the fixity of meaning. See Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the
Framers' Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1987); Posner, Law and Literature, 72 VA. L. REV.
1351 (1986).
4. See Minow, Law Turning Outward, TELOS (forthcoming) (comparing law and literature
movement with critical legal studies and law and economics; law and literature movement seems to
include participants across camps defined by other schools of thought).
5. Thus, this project addresses two distinct, and yet, overlapping debates within academic disci-
plines: (1) the methodological debate over interpretation versus positivism and functionalism; and (2)
the aspirational debate over whether to use knowledge to struggle against dominant patterns of power
or to treat knowledge as indifferent to, or cooperating with, established power arrangements. As cur-
rently played out, methodological interpretivists contest whether interpretation can be a form of cri-
tique arid methodological positivists argue over whether empirical work (or, for lawyers, positive state
sanctions) can or should challenge existing social arrangements. Another battle line is drawn between
those who advocate resistance to established power through interpretive strategies, and those who seek
to discover facts, rights, or authority for change. A chart summarizing these lines may help explain
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and give meaning to norms, through a language of rights, often and im-
portantly occur outside formal legal institutions such as courts. "Legal
interpretation," in this sense, is an activity engaged in by nonlawyers as
well as by lawyers and judges. Interpretive activity appeals not to one
overriding authoritative community, but instead to people living in worlds
of differences. Through interpretive activity, people summon up a sense of
potential community membership without relinquishing struggles over
meaning and power.
This interpretive approach to law offers a promising defense against the
two-fronted war on rights waged by right-wing and left-wing critics. It
responds to the charges from the right that "new rights" lack objective
foundations and to the charges from the left that rights are indeterminate
by pointing to the social and intellectual processes by which individuals
and groups make meaning. This approach responds to a charge from the
right that rights promote conflict rather than community, and to a claim
from the left that rights reinforce individualism at the expense of commu-
nity.' The interpretive approach permits debate over legal and political
choices without pretending a social harmony that does not exist and with-
out foreclosing social changes as yet unimagined. It grounds rights in the
processes of communication and meaning-making, rather than in abstract
or enduring foundations.
The first part of this essay defends the interpretive approach. I pursue
these interpretive themes and develop what may seem to be a counter-
intuitive defense of rights as tools to express and strengthen community.
The second part of the essay turns to an important challenge to the inter-
pretive approach posed by Robert Cover's essay, Violence and the Word.7







p tterns of pow"
I believe that the interpretive method more fully accounts for other methods and therefore is superior
to them, but I recognize that the very criteria for evaluating competing methods are incommensurate
and inconsistent. Persuasion across camps, therefore, is unlikely to proceed in methodological terms.
6. Although there is an intriguing convergence here between the right and left invocations of
"community," the term "community" no doubt signals divergent conceptions. See Parker, Issues of
Community and Liberty, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 287 (1985) (distinguishing conservative repub-
lican community that includes hierarchy from populist republicanism, which is committed to equal-
ity). Compare Berns, Does the Constitution "Secure These Rights?," in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE
CONsTIrrUxON? 56, 76 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1980) (authoritarian community) with M.
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (liberal community) and Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEx.
L. REV. 1417 (1984) (community of social change).
7. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Violence and the
Word]; see also Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the
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Interpreting Rights
Indeed, as in other areas, Cover's work changes the terms of discussion;
we cannot go on the way we were going after we hear his words. The
second half of this essay engages the terms of the debate Cover introduces,
and takes seriously his call to unearth what the interpretive approach may
conceal.
In an effort to avoid the usually abstract nature of discussions of de-
bates over rights and legal interpretation, I will explore these themes in
the context of children's rights. A heated debate about whether the rights
of adults should extend to children occupies litigation and social commen-
tary. Even rights declared in the past for children may be withdrawn, and
the vulnerability of children's rights to shifting interpretations demon-
strates the human authorship of rights.' For me, the question is very truly
how to "reconcile the sight of a battered child with the belief that we
choose what happens to us, that we create our own world,"9 through ac-
tion and interpretation.
When I started work on this project not long ago, I thought to myself,
Bob Cover will help me sort this out, and help me see where I am wrong.
I knew he was working on the essay that became Violence and the Word;
I knew he was critical of "interpretive" legal scholarship for suppressing
the difference between law and the interpretation of literary texts. Yet, I
also drew sustenance from from his conceptions of interpretive communi-
ties, and his own practice of creating them. I am one of so many people
left, as Avi Soifer says, in mid-conversation, bereft of words to describe
this loss of a man who so understood what words can and cannot say.
This essay, for Bob, is my small effort to reach toward the kind of conver-
sation he will inspire for years to come.
I. A CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUES
Can we create meaning for our lives without demeaning the lives of
others?
-Thomas Szasz' °
Two widely announced criticisms of current legal developments are that
Role, 20 GA. L. REv. 815 (1986) [hereinafter The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation].
8. See infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing shifts in constitutional rulings about mi-
nors' rights in criminal justice system). Minors' First Amendment rights also may be undergoing
renovation. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
with Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); see also Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
School Dist., 795 F.2d 1369 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (1986) (censorship of
student newspaper rejected by circuit court; Supreme Court review pending).
9. Anzald6a, supra note 1.
10. T. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS 287 (1970).
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rights have proliferated without legitimate authority and that this explo-
sion of rights has produced, as well as expressed, dysfunctional social con-
flict, litigiousness, and loss of community.11 Both charges have been exten-
sively debated, so I will not rehearse the arguments here. Suffice it to say
that serious public figures and scholars challenge new kinds of legal rights
for lacking basis in the text of the Constitution and other anchors of legal
authority;1 some even charge that the preoccupation with rights is an
illness in this society that prevents the development of social harmony.
1 3
Scholars associated with the Conference on Critical Legal Studies ad-
vance another critique of rights. Some of these scholars argue that rights
are internally incoherent because they articulate contradictory goals, such
as "freedom" and "security." '14 Such incoherence, according to the critics,
permits the evils of manipulation and mystification by those who wield
rights rhetoric, and produces alienation in those who confront the legal
system. In addition, some scholars criticize prevailing rights for presup-
posing and reinforcing a notion that every individual is autonomous and
11. See L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 6-22 (1985) (discussing perceived "litigation explosion,"
crisis of legal legitimacy, and charges of "too many lawyers"). Friedman's analysis explores the sub-
stance of a "new legal culture" that includes a "general expectation of justice" and "a general expec-
tation of recompense." Id. at 43. This analysis identifies modern doctrinal developments and invites
judgment in these terms rather than in terms of the increasing number of lawyers and lawsuits. See
also Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (arguing
that perceptions of pathological litigiousness in U.S. are incorrect).
12. See, e.g., The Federalist Soc'y, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CON-
STrruTION (1986) (speeches by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Justice John Paul Stevens, Judge Robert H. Bork, and President Ronald Reagan); Berns, supra note
6; Brest, Meese, the Lawman, Calls for Anarchy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, at E23, col. 1. The
search for foundations is often treated as a show-stopper in a cultural and political milieu uncertain
about ultimates. Yet the dictionary defines "foundation" as simply the underlayer upon which we
place subsequent layers-not an ultimate bedrock. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
454 (1977) (foundation is "the act of founding," "the basis upon which something stands or is sup-
ported," and "a body or ground upon which something is built up or overlaid"). We create founda-
tions; we found institutions; we are participants, constituting an order. The integrative, interactive
frame of analysis adopted in this essay does not, however, respond to the objectivist or functionalist
theorists in terms of their own criteria that express a contrasting theory of knowledge and meaning.
See also Berns, supra note 6 (we can assess degree of "democracy" of Constitution by looking to
issues involved in its ratification).
13. See, e.g., R. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR TIME 3
(1984) (expanding concern over civil liberties in America has "disable[di major American institutions,
both governmental and private"); Bork, The Struggle over the Role of the Court, 34 NAT'L REV.
1137 (1982); Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?, REG., Mar.-Apr. 1978,
at 15, 44 (harmful effect of expanding legal process on society).
14. For an elegant version of this claim, see Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract
Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985) (discusses inconsistency and indeterminacy of contract doctrine).
This charge can be met with the response that legal rules are applied in specific contexts, and by
reference to specific contextual features we can resolve, at least for that instant case, the tension
between, say, freedom and security. In context, similarly, language takes on meaning. Any word re-
peated many times out of context can come to sound absurd, but in context and use, people endow it
with meaning. Contexts themselves are mutable, not given, yet by moving between word and context,
and by choosing among contexts, people make meanings and test them with their ways of living.
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disconnected from others, instead of connected in important ways to other
individuals and to society in general.15 This communitarian challenge re-
sembles the yearning for social harmony present in the writings of some
conservative critics,"R although conservative and radical scholars diverge
on their particular conceptions of community, the good, and the concerns
of individuals.
These debates about legal texts resemble debates in literary theory
about the meaning of literary texts.17 Can the reader discern the "true"
meaning of the text, the author's intent, or some other authoritative mean-
ing? Or is each text always susceptible to multiple interpretations, with
no authoritative meaning? 8 It is perhaps not surprising that legal theo-
rists and literary theorists read and cite each other in the midst of their
debates. 9 Some legal theorists hope to find foundations for legal meaning
in the analogy to literary interpretation, perhaps foundations in specific
communities of interpreters; others hope to expose the multiple, and some-
times suppressed, meanings of legal texts.
Debates in legal and literary theory converge in the work of several
authors who have developed ideas about the ways that texts help to create
communities, to establish shared discourse, and to provide contexts for
linking past with future, and creativity with tradition. James Boyd White,
Milner Ball, Ronald Dworkin, and Robert Cover have each expressed
variations on this set of ideas, which I call the "interpretive turn." White
writes that "[l]egal argument is an organized and systematic process of
conversation by which our words get and change their meaning."20 Ball
15. My own work has criticized rights for preserving an inquiry into "real difference" in the
equal protection context, see Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally
Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111
(1987) [hereinafter Minow, When Difference Has Its Home], and for emphasizing autonomous indi-
vidualism rather than communal responsibilities, see Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That
Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819. In these works, I also have
argued for reinterpreting rights to embody a richer conception of human interdependence. This essay
is another effort to read rights in this way.
16. See R. NIsBEr, THE QUESTION FOR COMMUNITY (1953).
17. See Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1606 n.15. Christopher Norris, a literary theo-
rist, in discussing the debates in literary theory and legal theory, has compared what he calls "con-
servative uses of the analogy between law and literature," which appeal to consensus meanings, with a
deconstructive approach, which emphasizes the irreconcilable choices posed by texts. C. NORRIS, THE
CONTEST OF FACULTIES 182 (1985); see id. 167-92.
18. See Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 551 (1982); Fish, supra note 3.
19. The Fish-Fiss debate is an obvious instance. See Fish, supra note 3; Fiss, supra note 3; Fiss,
Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985); see also Levinson, supra note 3, at (legal theorists
engaged in debate about nature of textual interpretation).
20. J.B. WHITE, supra note 2, at 268. Similarly, he argues: "This Constitution-like other such
instruments-is thus in a literal sense a rhetorical Constitution: it constitutes a rhetorical community,
working by rhetorical processes that it has established but can no longer control. It establishes a new
conversation on a permanent basis." Id. at 246. My concern about White's work is that it paints too
cozy a picture of the world, assuming agreement and commonality precisely where they are lacking.
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explains: "I have proposed law as medium-law as connecting rather
than disconnecting, enhancing a flow of dialogue, containing the dynamics
of life in common."21 Dworkin suggests that
Law's attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to
lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better future,
keeping the right faith with the past. It is, finally, a fraternal atti-
tude, an expression of how we are united in community though di-
vided in project, interest, and conviction.
22
Cover evokes the normative universe that "is held together by the force of
interpretive commitments-some small and private, others immense and
public."23 He adds that "[tihe intelligibility of normative behavior inheres
in the communal character of the narratives that provide the context of
that behavior." '24 For Cover, the kinds of communities in which normative
meanings can be nurtured are likely to be outside official secular legal
culture, and may even be undermined by the official legal rules. Nonethe-
less, his framework for understanding legal meaning-official and unoffi-
cial, public and private-depends upon a notion of meaning-making
through communal narratives.
Before drawing on these interpretive themes, I should try to clarify
what I mean by "rights," an overused word in legal, philosophical, and
political debates. Defining "rights" is a difficult task because there is con-
siderable ambiguity in the meanings invoked in the debates about rights,
and because much ink has been spilled by legal and political theorists on
this subject. One meaning is the formally announced legal rules that con-
cern relationships among individuals, groups, and the official state.
"Rights" typically are the articulation of such rules in a form that de-
scribes the enforceable claims of individuals or groups against the state.25
My own approach seeks to make disagreement and difference central when different people interpret
their social relations through a rhetoric of rights.
21. M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 122 (1985). He
specifically suggests that we can "discern in international law the shaping of a forum and a language
for the dynamics of international conversation." Id. at 66.
22. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 413 (1986). Perhaps more than the others, Dworkin is inter-
ested in finding foundations for legal decisions, but he rejects the possibility of discerning the author's
intent, see id. at 228-29, and instead, analogizing legal and literary interpretation, calls for explora-
tion of the layers of meaning and tensions between practices and purposes. See id. at 47-49.
23. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 47 (1983) [hereinafter Nomos and Narrative]. Cover's critique of the interpretive turn is the
subject of Section II of this essay.
24. Id. at 10.
25. Some theorists have offered typologies of rights and analyses of the relation among kinds of
rights. See I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESAYS ON LIBERTY (1969) (distinguishing
positive and negative liberties); W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919) (analyz-
ing distinctions and relations among privileges, powers, immunities, and rights); R. UNGER, 2 PoLi-
Tics (forthcoming) (distinguishing immunity rights, solidarity rights, market rights, and destabiliza-
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Yet a second meaning will become important in this essay. "Rights" can
give rise to "rights consciousness" so that individuals and groups may
imagine and act in light of rights that have not been formally recognized
or enforced. Rights, in this sense, are neither limited to nor co-extensive
with precisely those rules formally announced and enforced by public au-
thorities. Instead, rights represent articulations-public or private, formal
or informal-of claims that people use to persuade others (and them-
selves) about how they should be treated and about what they should be
granted. I mean, then, to include within the ambit of rights discourse all
efforts to claim new rights, to resist and alter official state action that fails
to acknowledge such rights, and to construct communities apart from the
state to nurture new conceptions of rights. Rights here encompass even
those claims that lose, or have lost in the past, if they continue to re-
present claims that muster people's hopes and articulate their continuing
efforts to persuade.
Consciousness, or cognizance, of rights, then, is not simply awareness of
those rights that have been granted in the past, but also knowledge of the
process by which hurts that once were whispered or unheard have become
claims, and claims that once were unsuccessful, have persuaded others and
transformed social life. The connections between past and future claims of
rights are voiced through interpretations of inherited understandings of
rights. Interpretation engages lawyers and nonlawyers in composing new
meanings inside and outside of legal institutions. Charges against new
rights express opposition to this interpretive process.
A. The Charges Against Children's Rights
Familiar criticisms of rights are quite pronounced in the context of chil-
dren's rights. Perhaps no one denies a child's right to live, and therefore,
to be safe from murder.2" Children's rights include many of the rights
tion rights); Golding, The Primacy of Welfare Rights, I Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 119 (1984) (comparing
right to liberty with welfare rights as entitlements to goods); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 597-600 (1983). Although some of these distinctions may be helpful to
particular arguments developed in this essay, the general definition of rights offered in the text will be
the touchstone for my analysis, and I do not mean to engage directly the vast philosophical literature
on rights. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (rev. ed. 1977); A. GEWIRTH, HUMAN
RIGHTS (1982); N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1982); A. MELDEN,
RIGHTS AND PERSONS (1977); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See generally THEORIES
OF RIGHTS (J. Waldron ed. 1984) (essays on varied conceptions of rights).
As signified by my second definition of rights, I mean to downplay the significance of the state both
in the generation and enforcement of rights; instead, I am interested in the normative discourse of
rights. See also Cover, Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REv. 179 (1985)
[hereinafter Folktales of Justice] (exploring normative language apart from official power).
26. Early treatment of infanticide and contemporary debates about abortion suggest that even this
"right to live" is less than obvious, and that certainly there remains debate about when life begins for
this purpose. See K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984) (reviewing
abortion debates); L. STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 296-99
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enjoyed by adults, such as rights to freedom of expression,27 freedom from
unwarranted searches and seizures, 28 and freedom of choice about
whether to terminate a pregnancy.29 Children's rights also could include
rights particular to children, like a right to quality education tailored to
meet the individual's needs, a right to decent foster care when under state
custody, or a right to a hearing before suspension from public school.
Children's rights may take the form of claims for independence and free-
dom from constraint, claims for care and protection, or claims for relation-
ships with others.8 0
These days, children's rights have become a subject for jokes, as well as
a target for critiques of judicial excesses. A cartoon in a newspaper may
show a little tyke introducing a stranger to his parents: "Mom and Dad,
I'd like you to meet my lawyer."'" Jokes point out extremes and incon-
gruities. We select these oddities for humorous jibes not simply at random,
but because they make us uncomfortable. Children's rights make adults
uncomfortable because they represent new ideas, or old ideas in new
(abr. ed. 1979) (discussing traditional acceptance of infanticide).
27. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). But see Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (approving conviction for sale of magazines to minor although
magazine would not be obscene if sold to adults).
28. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the Court ruled that children do enjoy Fourth
Amendment protections, but that their content may differ from the protections assured to adults. Com-
pare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (guaranteeing juvenile rights to hearing, cross examination, and
counsel in juvenile court proceedings) with Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (denying
minors protections against preventive detention because minors lack liberty interest identical to that of
adults).
29. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). But see H.L. v. Mathe-
son, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (states may require parental notification before unemancipated minor de-
pendent upon her parents may obtain abortion).
30. See H. COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1980); M.D.A. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS
AND WRONGS OF CHILDREN (1983); L. HOULGATE, THE CHILD & THE STATE: A NORMATIVE
THEORY OF JUVENILE RIGHTS (1980); Rodham, Children's Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHIL-
DREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21 (P. Vardin & 1. Brody eds. 1979); WHOSE
CHILDREN?: CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER (W. Aiken & H.
LaFollette eds. 1980). See generally Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to
Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Minow, Rights for the Next Gener-
ation] (exploring links between struggles for children's rights and women's rights); Minow, Are
Rights Right for Children? 1987 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. J. (forthcoming) (reviewing IN THE INTER-
EST OF CHILDREN (R. Mnookin ed. 1985)).
31. A best-selling humor book includes a rhyme that betrays a lingering sense of incongruity in
the idea of "children's rights," or perhaps, an imagined triviality of the kinds of concerns represented
by rights for children: "Strike! Strike! For Children's Rights /Longer week ends /Shorter school
hours /Higher allowances /Less baths and showers /No brussel sprouts /More root beer /And sev-
enteen summer vacations a year! If you're ready to strike-line up right here." S. SILVERSTEIN, A
LIGHT IN THE ATTc 128-29 (1981). An article directed at nonlawyers cites as absurd the case of a
Colorado student who sued his parents for intentional infliction of emotional distress after they pun-
ished him for smoking and selling marijuana. Mikva, Judges and Other People's Children, in
PARENTHOOD 220, 222-23 (R. Cohen, B. Cohler & S. Weissman eds. 1984); see also An Interview
with Marian Wright Edelman, 44 HARv. EDUC. REV. 53, 66-67 (1974) (critical of "liberation" for
children, who instead need "special protections"); Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egali-
tarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
605 (critical of rights for children).
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forms, and signal that adults and existing practices have to change. Per-
haps, though, jokes about children's rights express, through the art of triv-
ializing, the positions of power adults generally have over children. Too
often, the vulnerability of children is forgotten in a culture that assigns
responsibility for their care, in the first instance, to the private sphere of
particular parents. 2 This pattern exonerates anyone but the child's par-
ents from responsibility for the care and needs of the child and shields the
child from public view. Current patterns of damage to children, due to
poverty and other social conditions, should disturb our complacency about
this public neglect.33 Advocates for children typically make claims about
children's rights, despite prevailing rules of parental and judicial discre-
tion, in an effort to challenge public complacency and to yield particular
results in particular cases.
Increasingly, children's rights have triggered sharp ideological debates.
Such conflict was raised by Goss v. Lopez,"4 where the Supreme Court
considered what process was due to children facing disciplinary action by
school officials. The ideological debate in Goss involved competing views
of human relationships. The plaintiffs demanded due process hearings
before a student could be suspended from school. This demand invoked
the autonomy and entitlement of each student: Each student deserves an
opportunity to be heard before facing punishment; thus, each child needs
a judicial grant of an individual right to restrain the actions of school
authorities. In contrast, the defendants presented a conception of school as
community, or family. In such a setting, the interests of individuals are
shared. Continuing relationships would be frustrated by the formality and
distance imposed by legal procedures-that is, by rights. In his dissenting
opinion in Goss, which he read aloud from the bench, Justice Powell em-
phasized that
In assessing in constitutional terms the need to protect pupils from
unfair minor discipline by school authorities, the Court ignores the
commonality of interest of the State and pupils in the public school
system. . . . In mandating due process procedures the Court misap-
prehends the reality of the normal teacher-pupil relationship. There
is an ongoing relationship, one in which the teacher must occupy
many roles-educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-
substitute. It is rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the
32. See Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 30, at 5-8 (discussing patterns of
economic and psychological risks for children and neglect of children in public arena).
33. See infra note 123 (discussing child abuse statistics).
34. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Franklin Zimring and Raymond Solomon provide a thoughtful explora-
tion of the facts and arguments behind the litigation in a recent case study that provides the basis for
some of my analysis. See Zimring & Solomon, Goss v. Lopez: The Principle of the Thing, in IN THE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN 450; supra note 30.
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chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the teacher must
be free to discipline without frustrating formalities.3"
In the terms of this debate, the recognition of rights seems to define and
accentuate the distance between people. Rights for students seem to pin
them in adversarial relationships to teachers and school administrators.
The debate over the proper rules governing relationships are especially
intense when children and public schooling are the focus. Choices about
the next generation starkly require society to make decisions about funda-
mental values for the future. The rules that govern life within the school
also convey a message to students about the world beyond the school. The
significance of the choice of rules was not lost on the plaintiffs in the Goss
litigation. Lawyers for the children sought to weave into their arguments
the idea that "freedom and democracy are necessary in the schools to
teach the young democracy." 8 Justice Powell adopted an equally em-
phatic argument on the other side:
Education in any meaningful sense includes the inculcation of an
understanding in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience
thereto . . . .When an immature student merits censure for his
conduct, he is rendered a disservice if appropriate sanctions are not
applied or if procedures for their application are so formalized as to
invite a challenge to the teacher's authority-an invitation which re-
bellious or even merely spirited teenagers are likely to accept.
37
Implicit in Justice Powell's position are two objections to the assertion
and grant of rights for children. The first is that rights, when claimed and
recognized, create conflict and adversarial relations between children and
adults where there otherwise would be community and shared interests.
The second is that children lack the kind of autonomy and competence
presumed by the idea of a right, and therefore, require protection from
adults. Children's rights would undermine this critical relationship be-
35. 419 U.S. at 593-94 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)
(presuming nonadversarial relationship between children and parents who seek to commit children to
mental hospitals, and treating medical professionals as capable of providing independent review of
parents' decisions).
36. Letter from Eric Van Loon to Denis Murphy and Ken Curtin, quoted in Zimring & Solo-
mon, supra note 34, at 476 (letter accompanying draft brief).
37. 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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tween children and adults. 8 But the interpretive approach to legal analy-
sis provides another vantage point from which to view these objections.39
B. Interpreting Conflict and Affirming Community
Legal language translates, but does not initiate, conflict.4 ° The fear that
judicial recognition of rights for children would inject conflict and invite
38. Although child-rearing notions are themselves deeply imbued with the political attitudes dom-
inant in a particular culture at a given historical moment, many theorists have emphasized how the
relationship between parent and child demands that parents have authority to restrict children's per-
sonal freedom. See, e.g., J. KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 257-64 (1984). Some theorists have
maintained that the child must internalize a sense of parental authority, and that external intervention
between parent and child will undermine the development of this sense of internalized limits. The
child will grow up feeling weak, and will want to find others to be scapegoats. See C. LASCH, HAVEN
IN A HEARTLESS WORLD 174-78 (1977) ("delegation of discipline to other agencies" than family
promotes projection of "forbidden impulses" onto outcast groups); Frenkel-Brunswick, Parents and
Childhood as Seen Through the Interviews, in THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 358, 359 (T.
Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. Levinson & R. Sanford eds. 1950) ("[T]he existing identification
with the parents is often accompanied by a more basic identification with mankind and society in
general."). One legal observer suggests that "in a paradoxical but important sense, a child has a basic
right to be protected against freedom" precisely because learning about the consequences of bad judg-
ments is an important part of childhood. Hafen, Exploring Test Cases in Child Advocacy, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 435, 446 (1986) (reviewing IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN (R. Mnookin ed. 1985)). Thus,
Hafen, and others, have warned against "abandoning children to their rights." Id. at 445-46.
39. Although some observers criticize reliance on legal rights for introducing adversariness, or for
emphasizing autonomy rather than cooperation, see J. HANDLER, THE: CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION:
AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY 72-76, 121-58 (1986), others charge various forms of the
interpretive turn with submerging conflict among groups, see Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20
GA. L. REV. 871 (1986) (criticizing White). See generally Abel, Delegalization: A Critical Review of
Its Ideology, Manifestations and Social Consequences, in ALTERNATIVE REcHTSFORMEN UND AL-
TERNATIVEN ZUM RECHT: JAHRBUCH FOR REcHTSsOzIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 27 (E. Blank-
enburg, E. Klausa & H. Rottleuthner eds. 1980). I suggest that law is one arena, complete with
language and institutions, where conflict can be enacted and temporarily resolved. The translation of
conflict into legal discourse is not without consequences. Some of the consequences could include dis-
torting the nature and scope of perceived conflict by the demand of an established idiom. Fitting
women's claims, for example, into an equality framework that makes sameness to men a prerequisite
may distort or deny the importance of differences. See, e.g., Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A
Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986). See generally
L. PEATrE & M. REIN, WOMEN'S CLAIMS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 102-26 (1983)
(exploring how prevailing system shaped claims of U.S. Women's movement, which, in turn, raised
new categories of claims). Yet, the law itself can be reshaped by the conflicts brought to it. See, e.g.,
California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 55 U.S.L.W. 4077 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 85-
494) (interpreting Title VII's antidiscrimination commitment to be consistent with California's preg-
nancy disability leave statute).
40. As with so many translations, something may be lost in the process. See G. STEINER, AFTER
BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION (1975). Using language that is not one's own
can limit, distort, and even silence. See Minow, Learning To Live with the Dilemma of Difference:
Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 165-66 (1985) (discussing
effect of exclusively English-language schooling on children primarily fluent in another language);
Finley, supra note 39, at 1163-65 (1986) (discussing limits of legal language to respond to women's
issues); see also MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 14 (1985):
[I]f you are the tree falling in the epistemological forest, your demise doesn't make a sound if
no one is listening. Women did not 'report' [rape and battery] events, and overwhelmingly do
not today, because no one is listening, because no one believes us. This silence does not mean
nothing happened, and it does not mean consent.
The formality of processes set in motion by rights claims may also alter or even impede certain kinds
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rebelliousness is mistaken in two ways, as demonstrated by the Goss v.
Lopez litigation. First, conflict was present long before anyone asserted in
court that students had rights. Minority students were suspended without
hearings after racial conflicts erupted in the Columbus, Ohio schools.
4
1
The school administration had cancelled an assembly program organized
by black students for Black History Week. Shortly thereafter, two black
students were shot by white students. These events precipitated several
disturbances. 42 Following these events, a local chapter of the NAACP met
with parents and students to discuss racism in the school disciplinary
practices.43
In such a context, it is difficult to believe that the introduction of legal
rights would disrupt a community of nonadversarial interests shared
among students and teachers. 44 Similarly, where a pregnant minor seeks
an abortion without parental consent because of her parents' religious or
philosophical opposition, warm family consultation might be preferable,
but may be impractical, given the circumstances. Denying the minor inde-
pendent legal rights in such a situation hardly prevents conflict. 4 Asser-
tion of rights in these contexts does not initiate conflict, but rather gives it
public expression and provides a method for public resolution.46
of communication. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983) (discussing detriments and
benefits of mass delivery of adversarial process in benefits context); Simon, Rights and Redistribution
in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1499-1504 (1986) (welfare jurisprudence distorted by
rights rhetoric and analogy to private law). The claim of rights, however, need not predetermine the
forms of requisite processes; people can use rights discourse to develop new procedures and remedies,
as well as new claims. See J. HANDLER, supra note 39, at 141-53 (separating adversariness from
liberal legalism and calling for cooperative dimension in reconstructing rights); MacKinnon, supra
(advocating tort claims for women injured by pornography).
41. Zimring & Solomon, supra note 34, at 459-72.
42. Id. at 460-61.
43. Id. at 467-68.
44. The Columbus, Ohio schools at the time of Goss were not unusual with respect to the pres-
ence of conflict. See generally S. LIGHTFOOT, WORLDS APART: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FAMILIES
AND SCHOOLS (1978) (exploring complex, and often conflicting, interactions among parents, teachers,
children, and officials in school settings).
45.
It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute power to overrule a
determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to terminate the patient's preg-
nancy will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will
enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so
fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the
family structure.
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
46. The use of rights rhetoric, and the warfare of litigation, can make covert conflict overt, and
therefore, it may appear disruptive. See Fitzgerald, A Reporter at Large: A Disagreement in
Baileyville, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 1984, at 47. Litigation per se may enlarge disputes that
would otherwise smolder, but it also may narrow disputes that would otherwise expand. See Trubek,
The Constitution and Deconstruction of a Disputes-Focused Approach: An Afterword, 15 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 727, 732-33 (1980-1981); see also Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985) (exploring presence of state even when state does not "intervene").
Some might claim that the two problems suggested by Goss and Danforth represent extreme cases of
conflict in settings usually characterized by harmony, and we would not devise rules for the extreme
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In other contexts, the charges that rights introduce conflict and adver-
sariness have been levied by people who do not want to change existing
patterns of domination. Such objections have been raised to criminalizing
rape committed within a marriage47 and to giving employees rights.48
Rights, as both initial efforts to demand public debate about existing pat-
terns of private power, and as official rules enforcing changes in those
patterns, create conflict only by giving public voice and force to people
previously ignored. Although such expression may amplify conflict and
focus attention on it, it also may transform physical conflict into verbal
disputes.4
Secondly, the introduction of rights to the school disciplinary process
does not inject conflict because rights arguments, in essence, reconfirm
community. The particular right ultimately announced in Goss amounted
to no more than minimal notice and an opportunity for the student to
have a conversation with a school official, much as any sensitive school
official or parent would talk to a child before punishing her.50 This right
situation. Cf Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 10-14 (1984) (urging judicial attention to future consequences of princi-
ples laid down today rather than merely retrospective responses to particular fact situations). In re-
sponse, I suggest that the rules we devise help create the exceptions, and the important challenge for
the legal community is to build frameworks illuminated by what we may have made marginal in the
past.
47. This view produced the traditional marital exception to rape laws, an exemption defended on
the grounds that it promotes marital privacy and reconciliation. See Hilf, Marital Privacy and
Spousal Rape, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 31, 32-34 (1980); Comment, Rape and Battery Between Hus-
band and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1954). The current trend, however, expresses the contrary
view that rape within marriage is blameworthy and is typically an expression of unequal power
within the marriage and of actual spouse abuse. See Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221
(1985) (disallowing marital exemption for rape); People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567
(1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2029 (1985) (holding marital exemption for rape unconstitutional);
Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986) (urging analysis in terms of gender discrimination to expose power
relations). For a discussion of the earlier view, barring "state intervention" from the family in the
name of domestic harmony, see Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1650 (1966).
48. See Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Rep-
resentation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 357-63 (1984) (discussing institutional and conceptual obstacles
to realizing employee rights).
49. But see C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WoMEN 3-4 (1979) (discuss-
ing limits of legal language to express women's felt experiences). Legal language and structures may
make some points of view less easily expressed or may even suppress them.
In the ritual legal opera only certain kinds of song can be performed; only certain persons can
sing. Less powerful characters may not be allowed on stage. This point goes to the formulation
of ideas, their presentation in language and their legitimacy in law. . . . Law is a powerful
mechanism for recognizing or hiding the desires and perspectives of those whose lives it
governs.
O'Donovan, Family Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THOUGHT AND COMMON LAW 184, 191 (W.
Twining ed. 1986) (citation omitted).
50. 419 U.S. at 594-96 (Powell, J., dissenting). Some school officials suggest that Goss actually
permits educational opportunities by framing discussions of discipline and fairness. Others suggest
that Goss procedures inside the schoolhouse promote settlement of issues that might otherwise go to
court. School Superintendents' Seminar, Harvard Graduate School of Education (June 17, 1986).
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to a conversation is a good example of the way in which asserting rights
may actually affirm, rather than disturb, community. By invoking rights,
an individual or group claims the attention of the larger community and
its authorities. At the same time, this claim acknowledges the claimant's
membership in the larger group, her participation in its traditions, and
her observation of its forms." Although the language of rights, on its sur-
face, speaks little of community or convention, those who exercise rights
signal and strengthen their relation to a community. Those who are
claiming rights implicitly agree to abide by the community's response, and
to accord similar regard to the claims of others."2 In a deeper sense, those
claiming rights implicitly invest themselves in a larger community, even in
the act of seeking to change it. 53 Stating a claim in a form devised by those
51.
The law establishes roles and relations and voices, positions from which and audiences to
which one may speak, and it gives us as speakers the materials and methods of a dis-
course. . . . It is this discourse, working in the social context of its own creation, this language
in the fullest sense of the term, that is the law. It makes us members of a common world.
J.B. WHITE, supra note 2, at 266; see also M. BALL, supra note 21, at 122 ("I have proposed law as
medium-law as connecting rather than disconnecting, enhancing a flow of dialogue, containing the
dynamics of life in common."); R. DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 63 (citing Wittgenstein for notion that
participants in social practice must share form of life to recognize sense and purpose in what another
says and does); Pitkin, Justice on Relating Private and Public, 9 POL THEORY 327, 347 (1981)
(citing J. TUSSMAN, OaLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 78-81, 108, 116-17 (1960)):
Drawn into public life by personal need, fear, ambition or interest, we are there forced to
acknowledge the power of others and appeal to their standards. . . . We are forced to find or
create a common language of purposes or aspirations, not merely to clothe our private outlook
in public disguise, but to become aware of its public meaning. We are forced, as Joseph Tuss-
man has put it, to transform "I want" into "I am entitled to," a claim that becomes negotiable
by public standards.
52. Barbara Harrison put this essentially Kantian insight this way: "If any of us is prepared to
invoke anything as a human moral right on our own behalf, that very act implies the existence of a
similar claim for every other member of our species." B. HARRISON, MAKING THE CONNEcrIONS:
ESSAYS IN FEMINIST SOCIAL EmICS 168 (1985); see also Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1986) [hereinafter Traces
of Self-Government] ("It is the legal character that marks the output of the debate [of the common-
wealth] both as the product of reason and as the expression of the citizens' concrete universality, their
reciprocal recognition of sameness-within-difference."); Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability)
of Law in a Contradictory World, 28 NOMOS 71, 92 (1986) ("a right, however much it may be a
claim to respect as a distinct person, is, equally fundamentally, a claim grounded in human associa-
tion"). This commitment to basic equality is the powerful appeal of rights rhetoric, even though the
response to any claim ought to be understood as temporary. Any judgment, then, may set a precedent
for the next case, but then again, it may not.
53. Martin Luther King's justification for "direct action" as a way to assert the rights of blacks
intertwined notions of communal connection with demands for change:
Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals
could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analy-
sis and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of
tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the
majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. The purpose of our direct-action program
is to create a situation so crisis-packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation. ...
Too long has our beloved Southland been bogged down in a tragic effort to live in monologue
rather than dialogue.
King, Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 1963), reprinted in J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE:
AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, at 187 (1987). Such civil disobedience efforts express a
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who are powerful in the community expresses a willingness to take part
in the community, as well as a tactical decision to play by the rules of the
only game recognized by those in charge. 4
The skeletal due process mandated by Goss exposes how dependent in-
dividual rights are upon the established community order and how those
rights forge connections among individuals by requiring people to respond
to each other. 5 Can the student persuade the vice-principal not to sus-
pend her? Maybe not. For the student, "having the right" to try depends
upon the willingness of the vice-principal to take that right seriously. Sim-
ilarly, the Goss ruling announcing that right depended upon the willing-
ness of the Justices to engage in a serious conversation about students'
needs and, indeed, a willingness to include students as members of the
community, bound together through rights.5
The due process right in Goss is special in its specific call for communi-
cation and attention to the individual student's dignity. Thus, both in its
initial assertion and in its ultimate form, the right to a hearing before
suspension from school engages student and school administrators in a
process of discussion that can build a community of respect. Even beyond
the particular right granted by the Supreme Court in Goss, the claim-of
any right initiates a form of communal dialogue. A claimant asserts a
right and thereby secures the attention of the community through the pro-
commitment to the aspirations of a community belief inherent in "efforts." King continued, in his
letter to the eight Alabama clergymen who urged the Negro community to press for rights in court but
not in the streets: "I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust,
and willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community over its
injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for law." Id.
My notion of interpretation includes civil disobedience, and moreover, includes the activities of
those who adopt the "community" interpretive framework as part of a tactical effort to be heard, and
as a signal of a shared heritage and shared life.
Communities are those networks of people who believe their past communications had mean-
ing and who have faith that future communications will also have meaning. Community mem-
bers do not necessarily share substantive beliefs. Good friends who disagree strongly about
ideologies, scientific propositions, and questions of taste remain good friends as long as they
continue to use the same communicative framework.
L. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ART
OF POLITICS 15 (1985).
54. Such a claim represents an especially powerful statement when it is made by those who know
they have been excluded in the design of the very procedures for self-governance. Thus, subgroups
living within an essentially or even partly alien culture face a difficult dilemma in deciding whether to
submit their disputes to the courts of the larger community. Cf. J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT
LAW? 69-94 (1983) (discussing resistance within immigrant communities to submitting disputes to
governmental courts and retention of local religious or ethnic tribunals).
55. The results of some rights claims may be a ruling that some people do not have to deal with
others. Successful privacy claims and restraining orders in domestic abuse cases, in particular, have
this effect. Yet even these rulings result from an institutionally-framed discussion forcing people to
recognize each other's boundaries.
56. See O'Neill, The Public Use of Reason, 14 POL. THEORY 523, 527, 548 (1986) (toleration as
necessary for "plurality of potentially reasoning beings"); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 305-06 (1975) (commitment to real dialogue at heart of legitimacy includes
agreement to avoid privileged place of some views over others).
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cedures the community has designated for hearing such claims.5" The le-
gal authority responds, and though this response is temporary and of lim-
ited scope, it provides the occasion for the next claim. Legal rights, then,
should be understood as the language of a continuing process rather than
the fixed rules. Rights discourse reaches temporary resting points from
which new claims can be made.
Rights in this sense are not "trumps," but the language we use to try to
persuade others to let us win this round.58 When advocates for children
ask a court to recognize children's rights to privacy, due process, or other
protections, they seek judicial statements that will articulate new bound-
aries and connections between children and adults. 59 They seek the chance
to use these judicial articulations to negotiate new relationships between
children and adults in the arrangements of daily life.6" Here, rights pro-
vide a language which depends upon and expresses human interconnec-
57.
You could understand that a person arguing with you is giving you her time in a joint effort at
mutual understanding. That way, argument is a form of cooperation. Argument might be
thought of theatrically, along the lines of a dance, for example. The participants would then be
taking part in a joint enterprise whose purpose is a performance that works. . . . The action
becomes dialogue rather than diapolemics. And the outcome is something other than victory for
one party and defeat for the other. The success of a play or a piece of music can be measured,
it has been suggested, "by its ability to elicit connectedness."
M. BALL, supra note 21, at 133 (quoting The Talk of the Town, THE NEw YORKER, Mar. 15,
1982, at 33).
58. But see Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 153. Al-
though particular rights by their very content may assert a power to "trump," both their origins and
future viability depend upon a continuing, communal process of communication. No rights are self-
enforcing. Enforcement remains contingent upon the willingness of the community's officials to signal
their meaning to the community through force or threatened force. See infra Section II (responding to
discussion of violence and power). Whether rights are "determinate," whether their stated content
determines their specific meaning in particular contexts aside from the enforcement choices made by
specific officials, has been a subject of considerable dispute. Compare Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 293 (1984) (suggesting indeterminacy of rights and legal doctrinal categories) with Boyle, The
Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985)
(urging resolution of debates by reference to local, situated analysis) and Fiss, Objectivity and Inter-
pretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (taking issue with indeterminacy thesis). I believe it is possi-
ble to avoid this dispute by conceiving of rights as part of legal language, used to express claims that
depend upon particular choices, in specific contexts, for their meanings. See supra note 14. Those
meanings are created not only by the discretionary judgments of the officials involved, but also by the
conceptions of the litigants and the pressures produced by the broader polity. This is what I call the
"interpretive approach."
59. In this sense, rights are like commitments, made binding by those who make them. "[R]ights
are to law what conscious commitments are to the psyche." Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstruct-
ing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 424 (1987).
60. This notion of a continuing process of setting and resetting boundaries through communal
debate over rights claims resembles the conception of continual redefinition of the self's boundaries, a
conception powerfully present in the work of some psychologists. See, e.g., R. KEGAN, THE EVOLV-
ING SELF (1982); Benjamin, The Oedipal Riddle: Authority, Autonomy, and the New Narcissism, in
AUTHORITY IN AMERICA 195 (J. Diggins & M. Kann eds. 1981); Benjamin, The Bonds of Love:
Rational Violence and Erotic Domination, in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE 41, 47-51 (H. Eisen-
stein & A. Jardine eds. 1980) (citing G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 111-19 (A. Miller
trans. 1977)) (on master/slave relation).
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tion at the very moment when individuals ask others to recognize their
separate interests. Giving children rights to testify in court about sus-
pected child abuse-and even rights to testify on videotape, away from the
defendant-tips the balance of power toward children, temporarily, with-
out knocking them off the see-saw with adults.
In adopting this interpretive approach to rights, I mean to acknowledge
both the attractive and unattractive baggage of rights discourse. The his-
torical association of rights discourse in our culture with notions of equal-
ity, freedom, and respect for individuals is appealing. However, I mean to
challenge and reject a different historical association of rights discourse: its
tinge of legal positivism or objectivity that implies an authoritative basis or
foundation beyond current human choices. Insofar as a given set of rights
embodies the results of past struggles, it expresses a particular substantive
commitment. The civil rights movement, for example, created a legacy of
meanings for the Fourteenth Amendment, reflecting the commitment of
the civil rights activists and the officials persuaded by them to incorporate
elements of the movement into the formal legal system. Invocation of those
commitments, and that history, can add to the persuasive force generated
in rights discourse even when that discourse depends on nothing beyond
current and future human choices.
Thus, claims of rights have a special resonance in our culture, but they
are still vulnerable to rebuff. The rhetoric of rights draws those who use it
inside the community, and urges the community to pay attention to the
individual claimants, but underscores the power of the established order to
respond or withhold response to the individuals' claims. In addition, the
rhetoric of rights remains available for yet another individual or group to
claim attention and participate, which may complicate or even jeopardize
the claims already made by inviting a different community response.
This form of discourse draws each claimant into the community and
grants each a basic, if minimal, equality to participate in the process of
communal debate. James Boyd White put it this way: "[T]he [legal] case
establishes an essential equality between people . . . and it proceeds by a
method of argument and conversation that both recognizes the individual's
view of his own situation and complicates that view by forcing him to
recognize the claims of another."61 The discourse of rights registers com-
mitment to a basic equality among the participants as participants, even
when the participants are children. It is important, however, to distin-
guish the ways in which this basic form of equality creates a kind of com-
munity from the ways that inequality of power and status may well re-
61. J.B. WHITE, supra note 2, at 274. For a discussion of how the conversation among judges in
multi-judge courts can, and should, provide a model for the self-governing conversation for the larger
community, see Traces of Self-Government, supra note 52, at 34-36, 72-77.
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main within the community, and children provide important examples on
both counts.
Relatively recently, children have become subjects, rather than objects,
in the community bound together by rights discourse, and their participa-
tion registers a procedural equality: an equal right to be heard. The grad-
ual emergence of the idea that children can, in fact, have rights marks a
departure from an older view that adults have rights to children, as if
children were property. 2 In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform,6" which challenged state decisions to remove foster
children from their foster placements, the foster parents' attorney framed
a complaint drawing on this old view. The complaint sought to establish
that foster parents' rights over the child in their care would be sufficient
to trigger a due process hearing before the state could move the child to
another placement." The plaintiffs' attorney claimed to represent both the
foster parents and foster children in their shared interest in maintaining
relationships.
The district court, however, held that a potential conflict of interest be-
tween the children and the foster parents required separate representation
of the children. Further, the district court treated the children as separate
persons with distinct interests that must be voiced in the legal conversa-
tion. On this basis, the court appointed a separate attorney to speak for
the foster children.65 Although the case ultimately yielded no answer to
the constitutional question of due process rights in the foster care context,
the fact that the district court, and the Supreme Court on review, consid-
ered the claims of the children's attorney suggests that the judiciary recog-
nized children as distinct persons, deserving independent consideration. 6
Moreover, Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, wrote separately to emphasize that the state law rejected the
62. For a fascinating account of the transformation of children's social value from economic pro-
ducers to objects of affection, see V. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING
SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985).
63. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
64. See Chambers & Wald, Smith v. OFFER, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, supra note
30, at 81.
65. The appointed counsel happened to be a lawyer with long-standing associations with several
private foster care agencies essentially allied with the state in opposing due process rights for foster
parents. Id. at 91-95. Even though the children's attorney opposed due process rights, she urged the
court that no adult has a "right" to a child, and that foster parents cannot obtain "squatters' rights" to
a child simply by caring for other people's children. Id. at 96-97.
66. The Supreme Court has not always recognized the distinct personhood of children. See Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (Court authorized preventive detention for juveniles who, unlike
adults, lack liberty); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (presuming that parents act in their
children's best interests, Court rejected claims that children deserve adversarial due process protections
before civil commitment pursued by their parents).
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idea that long-term custody of children creates some sort of "'squatters'
rights,' ,,17 as though children were property.
Here, the very claim of rights by the foster parents implicated the chil-
dren in a communal process, which gave them roles as participants and
entitled them to the basic equality of consideration accorded by legal insti-
tutions to community members. This basic equality should not be con-
fused, however, with full political, social, economic, or cultural equality.
Rights claims neither confer equality nor transform the community into
one of complete equals, even though interpretivists, like White, sometimes
talk as though communal discourse produces communities of equals. We
know our communities are not like that. The assertion of membership
accomplishes something important, but it does not itself disturb or chal-
lenge unequal arrangements of economic and political power. It is, of
course, no news to either the powerful or the powerless that those with
power have power.6"
Children, in particular, are usually less powerful that others economi-
cally and politically, and certainly different, and more vulnerable, physi-
cally, emotionally, and mentally. The very content of rights children claim
invoke protection against others, given such inequalities. Rights may en-
tail different treatment, not the same treatment, precisely in recognition of
differences between individuals and groups.69
What, then, is the equality signaled by rights discourse? The equality
registered by rights claims is an equality of attention. The rights tradition
in this country sustains the call that makes those in power at least listen.
Rights-as words and as forms-structure attention even for the claimant
who is much less powerful than the authorities, and for individuals and
groups treated throughout the community as less than equal.7 0 The inter-
67. 431 U.S. at 857 (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285
n.2 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
68. As Carol Gilligan has noted: "If you have power, you can opt not to listen. And you do so
with impunity." Marcus, Spiegelman, DuBois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon & Menkel-Meadow,
The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A
Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 62 (1985).
69. A persistent problem with rights rhetoric, traditionally, is its implication of some essential
"sameness" as both a precondition and consequence for basic equality. Another problem is the seem-
ing "yes or no" quality of rights, rather than more fluid and flexible notions. See supra note 39. Both
features of traditional rights discourse are not immutable, however, and rights can be urged precisely
to recognize difference, see Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Posi-
tive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 513, 564 (1983)
(urging feminist litigators to adopt "a new model for sexual equality . . . one which can effectuate
equality in the context of inherent sex differences"); Traces of Self-Government, supra note 52, at 43
(law should recognize citizens' "sameness-within-difference"), and to pursue shifting and flexible re-
lief, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1300-01
(1976) (need for "ongoing remedial regime" in public law litigation where assumptions of community
are challenged).
70. There remain unstated assumptions here, as in so many claims of equality: for example, equal
to whom? Unstated is the presumed standard for comparison of the adult, white, competent male
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pretive approach construes a claim of right, made before a judge, as a plea
for recognition of membership in a community shared by applicant and
judge, much as reader and author share the world of the text.7 1 The lan-
guage of rights voices an individual's desire to be recognized in tones that
demand recognition.72 Rights discourse implicates those who use it in a
form of life, a pattern of social and political commitment. 3
Which claims will persuade, and how? With what consequences for
prior and subsequent claims? Which claims, indeed, will be recognized as
even deserving communal attention? 4 These are difficult and persistent
questions in a community committed to rights discourse. There is a risk
that those points of view that have been silenced in the past will continue
to go unheard, and will be least adaptable to the vocabulary of pre-
existing claims. These are issues for struggle, and some struggles may well
take place beyond rights discourse, beyond language. Some people may
feel so shut out that the appeal to a communal commitment to rights
makes no sense to them. Nonetheless, an interpretive conception of rights
is a way to take the aspirational language of the society seriously76 and to
promote change by reliance on inherited traditions. It is a way to chal-
lenge those who want to close the doors now that some of the previously
excluded have fought and found their way in.
78
citizen. Efforts to disclose the unstated standard are especially important where there is a coincidence
of knowledge and power: where the respected point of view goes unstated because the speaker is able
to remain unaware of other points of view simply because the structures of privilege and power give
his point of view the appearance of truth. See Minow, When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 15,
at 179 (discussing feminist attempts to show that "knowledge and identity are forged in social
relationships").
71. But will the judge shatter their shared world by directing, commanding, and legitimating a
violent end? This is the question posed in Section II, infra.
72. This does not mean that there are no important differences between rights discourse and other
kinds of conversations. See infra text accompanying note 190 (discussion of coerced conversations by
litigants before court).
73. Cf L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 46c-92c (G. Anscombe 3d ed.
1958) (exploring relation between language games and forms of life).
74. These questions may be included in what Cover considered as problems of jurisdiction, see
infra text accompanying notes 201-02.
75. Young people, in particular, may take the aspirational rhetoric of adults seriously, even in
moments of apparent political rebellion. See K. KENISTON, YOUNG RADICALS: NOTES ON COMMIT-
TED YOUTH 127 (1968) (young radicals' nahive hope that political system would work produced
frustration when it failed); K. KFNISTON, YOUTH AND DIssEr: THE RISE OF A NEW OPPosrrIoN
214 (1971):
With these particular young men and women, studied in 1967, what was most impressive was
not their rebellion against their parents or American society, but their ultimate fidelity to
both-their principled acceptance of the core values of their families, which in almost every
case were humanitarian, intellectual, liberal, democratic, and very American. Compared to
these traditional values, our actual society seemed to these young radicals (as it does to me)
grossly wanting.
76. Audre Lorde eloquently raised the problem that The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle
the Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 110 (1984). She wrote: "What does it mean when the tools
of a racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy? It means that only the
most narrow perimeters of change are possible and allowable." Id. at 110-11. Surely, legal discourse
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The metaphors of interpretation and conversation enable a conception
of community connections forged through the exchange of words in the
struggle for meaning." In a powerful novel about contemporary South
Africa, Nadine Gordimer's Rosa Burger responds to a critic of liberalism
by saying:
I'm not offering a theory. I'm talking about people who need to have
rights-there-in a statute book, so that they can move about in
their own country, decide what work they'll do and what their chil-
dren will learn at school. . . People must be able to create institu-
tions-institutions must evolve that will make it possible in practice.
That utopia, it's inside . . . without it, how can you . . . act?
1
The use of rights discourse affirms community, but it affirms a particular
kind of community: a community dedicated to invigorating words with
power to restrain, so that even the powerless can appeal to those words. It
is a community that acknowledges and admits historic uses of power to
exclude, deny, and silence-and commits itself to enabling suppressed
points of view to be heard, to make covert conflict overt.7 1 Committed to
making available a rhetoric of rights where it has not been heard before,
this community uses rights rhetoric to make conflict audible and unavoid-
able, even if limited to words, or to certain forms of words.80 If there is
is a paradigmatic case. Yet, just as Audre Lorde's own prose transformed inherited language and
ideas, and claimed difference as "that raw and powerful connection from which our personal power is
forged," id. at 112, an emphatic claiming of differences through rights language could help transform
existing legal and social structures. To continue the metaphor of the Master's House, the tools may be
used for renovations that make the house unrecognizable to its former landlords and more hospitable
to others.
77. See supra note 20 (quoting White). But White's version is more comfortable, and perhaps
more sanitized, than mine. In my view, if the conversations do not take place among equals, who have
equal opportunities to contribute to and influence what is said and what it means, the conversations
can reinforce, rather than correct, the patterns of domination. When the "conversation" is situated
within legal institutions, and its consequences carry legal, and potentially physical, force, the patterns
of domination become impressed with state power.
78. N. GORDIMER, BURGER'S DAUGHTER 296 (1979). The contrast between South Africa and
the United States is telling. A South African visitor, watching the televised special "Eyes on the
Prize" that chronicled the American Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s, told me that he was most
amazed by the way that Martin Luther King and others invoked the symbols of the United States as
banners for their struggles. That the Constitution and the Supreme Court represented ideals that
could be claimed by the excluded seemed unthinkable to this South African. See also Dugard, The
Jurisprudential Foundation of the Apartheid Legal Order, 18 PHIL. F. 115, 122 (1986-1987) (Black
majority lost confidence in South African law given its role in apartheid); Goldberg, Reading the
Signs: The Force of Language, 18 PHIL. F. 71, 89-90 (1986-1987) (language of racial difference
reinforces historical race relations; "language can act as a brake upon the rate of social
transformation").
79. See K. FERGUSON, THE F uINtSr CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 22-29 (1984) (discussing
subjugated discourses and possibilities for speaking about values and points of view excluded by con-
temporary bureaucracies).
80. For eloquent explorations of the processes of translation and distortion when people bring
their claims to the legal system-and for depictions of resulting successes and failures, see R. HARRIS,
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conflict experienced in the introduction of rights rhetoric to a new area, it
is over this issue: Should the normative commitment to restrain power
with communal dedication reach this new area? The power in question
may be public or private. For example, with children's rights, large dis-
agreements persist over whether and how communal limits should con-
strain the exercise of private, especially parental, power."' Children's
rights may enlarge state power over both children and adults, not simply
recognize children's pre-existing autonomy."2 But it is the meaning of au-
tonomy, and its relation to rights, that claims attention next.
C. Rights Do Not Presuppose Autonomy
A persistent argument against rights for children is that children lack
the autonomy necessary to engage in adversarial exchange, to protect their
own interests, and, indeed, to know their own interests.8" This challenge
to children's rights emphasizes the source of rights in traditional criteria,
with objective foundations. Another challenge to children's rights stresses
indeterminacy, and the seeming limitlessness of children's needs.84 These
objections grow out of a more widely accepted conception of rights, which
relies on the idea that the rights-bearing person is an autonomous individ-
ual capable of exercising choice for personal ends and able to protect per-
sonal freedom from the pressure and power of others. 5 Yet a community
FREEDOM SPENT (1976); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS
OF THE LAW (1976).
81. Since Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Supreme Court has tended to conclude that
public schools exercise official, rather than parental, power, and therefore, should be subject to legal
restrictions. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 741 (1985) ("If school authorities are state
actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is
difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public au-
thority when conducting searches of their students."); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)
("Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving from the parents, the
concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the view-more consonant with compulsory edu-
cation laws-that the State itself may impose corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 'for the
proper education of the child and for the maintenance of group discipline.' ") (footnote omitted).
82. Michael Grossberg's study of nineteenth century family law suggests that the expanding pro-
tections for children and women essentially produced greater judicial power and discretionary control
over families. M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 287-307 (1985).
83. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 31, at 644-56; Mnookin, The Enigma of Children's Interests, in
IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, supra note 30, at 16. But see Worsford, A Philosophical Justifica-
tion for Children's Rights, 44 HARV. EDUC. REv. 142 (1974).
84. See Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN, supra note 30, at 324
(describing how all potential parties are moved by needs of mentally retarded people until "insatiabil-
ity" of needs leads people to worry about costs and to worry about being overwhelmed).
85. See, e.g., Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts, in PATERNALISM 105 (R. Sartorius
ed. 1983); Raz, Right-Based Moralities, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 186-95. For
alternative notions of rights, see Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1417 (1984) (exploring
rights that build community); Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986) (exploring dialectic between experience and
women's rights); Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1433
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is presupposed by this notion of the autonomous rights-bearing individ-
ual-a community willing to recognize and enforce individual rights.
Even this usual conception of rights, premised on autonomy, relies on a
social and communal construction of boundaries among people. Bound-
aries, whether social, psychological, or legal, do not exist naturally; they
are invented and reinvented by people in formal and informal ways.88 As
a psychological matter, the very experience of a bounded personal identity
requires not just one individual, but many who help constitute the bound-
aries.8 7 In the words of one theorist, autonomy is a process of "parts that
mutually specify themselves," like M.C. Escher's drawing of two hands,
drawing each other."8
These insights about the precondition of relationships for the develop-
ment of autonomy undergird current work in psychology, anthropology,
and philosophy. Recent theories of human development emphasize how
aspects of the self develop from experiences with others, notably the
mother, such that "[t]he core of the self, or self-feeling, is also constructed
relationally." 89 The child needs to see the mother, the mother needs to see
the child, but most importantly, to begin the process of individuation, the
child needs to see the mother seeing him.90 Even beyond theories of child
(1986); see also T. Doi, THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (J. Bester trans. 1973) (exploring Japa-
nese conception of human interdependence in contrast to Western emphasis on autonomy). See gener-
ally Minow, When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 15 (describing traditional assumption of
competence for rights-bearers and offering alternative approach emphasizing social relations).
86. See M. BALL, supra note 21, at 15 ("For us to live in a world in which even the boundaries
are of our making is not so bad. If we had a foundation or objective boundaries, they might even get
oppressively in our way."). See generally A. COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF COMMU-
NITY (1985) (exploring social construction of membership and exclusion as elements of community);
K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1966) (exploring
how Puritans assigned people to deviant positions as way of conceiving boundaries of their cultural
universe).
87. See N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 57-73, 99-110, 191-205 (1978)
(psychological development of individual depends on relationship with parent through which individ-
ual boundaries are established).
88. Varela, The Creative Circle, in THE INVENTED REALITY 309-11 (P. Watzlawick ed. 1984).
89. Chodorow, Toward a Relational Individualism: The Mediation of Self Through Psychoanal-
ysis, in RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WEST-
ERN THOUGHT 197, 201 (T. Heller, M. Sosna & D. Wellbery eds. 1986); see also D. DINNERSTEIN,
THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1976) (mother-child relationship affects child's development of
boundaries). Chodorow relies in part on the work of object-relations theorists like Joan Riviere, who
wrote:
There is no such thing as a single human being, pure and simple, unmixed with other human
beings. Each personality is a world in himself, a company of many. . . .These other persons
are in fact therefore parts of ourselves, not indeed the whole of them but such parts or aspects
of them as we had our relation with, and as have thus become parts of us. And we ourselves
similarly have and have had effects and influences, intended or not, on all others who have an
emotional relation to us, have loved or hated us. We are members one of another.
Chodorow, supra, at 202-03 (quoting Riviere, The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World Re-
flected in Examples from Literature, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 358-59 (M. Klein,
P. Heimann & R. Money-Kyrle eds. 1955) (footnote omitted)).
90. D. WINNICOrr, THE FAMILY AND INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT (1965); Mahler, Symbiosis
and Individuation: The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant, in 2 M. MAHLER, THE SE-
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development, psychologists have begun to identify the capacity to form
commitments and connections to others, rather than autonomy, as the des-
tination for the maturing person." Philosophers have developed similar
insights. Drucilla Cornell interprets Hegel's view as suggesting that
"[o]ne becomes a self-identified ego only through interaction in which one
experiences oneself as a self by being mirrored in the eyes of others."'9 2
The metaphor of conversation, used by interpretive legal theorists, adopts
a similar view of the interdependence of individuals and the aspiration of
connection."3
According to this view, legal rights are interdependent and mutually
defining. They arise in the context of relationships among people who are
themselves interdependent and mutually defining.94 In this sense, every
right and every freedom is no more than a claim limited by the possible
claims of others. 5 Rights, in fact, could be understood as simply the artic-
ulation of legal consequences for particular patterns of human and institu-
tional relationships.96 Rather than expressions of some intrinsic auton-
omy, property rights announce complex, and often overlapping,
relationships of individuals and the larger community to limited re-
sources.97 Contract rights specifically govern the formation and dissolution
LECTED PAPERS 149 (1979); Winnicott, The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship, in THE MAT-
URATIONAL PROCESSES AND THE FACILITATING ENVIRONMENT 37 (1965); Mahler, Thoughts About
Development and Individuation, 18 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY CHILD 307 (1963).
91. See, e.g., 0. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 151-74 (1982).
92. Cornell, Toward a Modern lPostmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291,
361 (1985) (discussing Hegel's Jena manuscripts); see also M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIM-
ITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (criticizing protection of "unencumbered self" as goal of social arrangements).
93. Autonomy, even as an aspiration, is the invention of a cultural and linguistic community.
Through words and concepts, we symbolically construct our relations to one another in ways that
acknowledge our interdependence. See M. BALL, supra note 21, at 138 ("Freedom is the opposite of
chaos. . . . We are freed for that binding to others which locates and holds us no matter the dissolu-
tion of ordering boundaries or an order of oppressing boundaries."); C. GEERTE, supra note 2, at
73-93. White describes his approach to reading texts as analogous to change through interaction:
The idea of reading at work in this book is not simply the old-fashioned one of the discovery of
meaning, nor is it the new-fashioned one of the creation of meaning by a community of read-
ers; instead, it is the idea of an interaction between mind and text that works like an interac-
tion between people-it is in fact a species of that-and the expectations we bring to a text
should be similar to those we bring to people we know in our lives.
J.B. WHITE, supra note 2, at 18.
94. Inequality in the process of mutual definition is a significant problem. Our definitions of
ourselves are not equally regarded by others; majority groups have greater control over the definitions
not only of themselves, but also over those they define as "other." See Minow, When Difference Has
Its Home, supra note 15, at 169-73 (discussing labeling theory). Yet, the language of rights offers
some hope: It is the language of protest made legitimate by the powerful, even for use by the
powerless.
95. Hohfeld provides an elaborate articulation of the relational contexts in which rights assertions
arise. See Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld,
1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 986-94.
96. See Minow, Many Silent Worlds, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 197 (1987); Singer, The Reliance
Interest in Property (Jan. 1987) (unpublished manuscript).
97. Singer, supra note 96; see also M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY
(1981) (exploring "new property" concepts cross-culturally).
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of commercial relationships.9" Constitutional rights, such as freedom of
association, freedom of religion, and the fundamental rights to marry, pro-
create, and protect family ties, expressly describe legal claims to relation-
ships." Perhaps less obvious, but no less powerful, are legal rights regard-
ing tort liability, which give legal significance to relationships among
strangers.100 The rights of a tort victim cannot be defined without refer-
ence to others affected by the damage claims. Most notably involved is the
tortfeasor, but also implicated are those to whom costs may be shifted,
through insurance or pricing mechanisms.10
Autonomy, then, is not a precondition for any individual's exercise of
rights. The only precondition is that the community is willing to allow the
individual to make claims and to participate in the shifting of bound-
aries. °2 When a court acts, it defines the boundaries among people by
98. See I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980) (urging recognition of long-term rela-
tionships rather than single transactions as theory for contract law); Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REv. 55 (1963) (contractual planning and
contracts used for renegotiations of long-term relationships); Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
Llewellyn and the Uniform Commercial Code, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 504-09 (1987) (discussing
Llewellyn's notion of merchant transactions in which relationships within community of repeat-
players should influence nature of rules). See generally Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a
Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 567 (1983) (advocating "relationism" perspective about judi-
cial arrangements between institutions, groups, and others bound in ongoing long-term relations);
Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL L. REV. 314 (1935) (exploring significance of political, group,
familial, professional, and commercial relations for law).
99. See Weisbrod, Family, Church and State, Legal History Program Working Paper #2, Insti-
tute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison Law School. But see Minow, The Invention
of Tradition: The Constitution and the Family 73 J. AM. HIST. (forthcoming) (constitutional doc-
trines about families convert conflicts among religious and ethnic groups into conflicts between state
and family).
100. See G. CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Minow, supra note 96. Placing
human relationships on a spectrum moving from high to low degrees of intimacy, legal rules have
prescribed the terms and consequences of family and trustee/beneficiary relations, relations bound and
set by contractual terms, and relations among strangers. Transformations in the legal rules governing
each of these groups have been striking. Although legal rules once presumed an identity of interests
among family members and precluded access to law for resolving intra-family disputes, current devel-
opments articulate the rights of individual family members against one another. And although con-
tractual terms may once have set the limits of obligations between contracting parties, the development
of tort liabilities beyond the express terms of the contract-especially in the field of professional/client
relationships-has redefined the legal consequences of those relations. Even earlier, reliance notions
altered party control over the legal terms of relationships. For strangers, the growth of strict liability
and the transformation of products liability law have significantly tightened the connections imposed
by law.
101. Product liability rules transcend the boundaries between producers and victims, and make
producers view potential victims as unavoidably connected to their own decisions. See generally G.
CALABRESI, supra note 100.
102. One problem, however, is the question of what constitutes a community. Many communities
may be present within one geographic area, or no community may exist at all in the sense that people
do not experience themselves as members in a collective enterprise of mutual interdependence. These
are serious issues that deserve exploration. Yet, they do not undermine the particular assertions that
the adoption and use of legal language affirms and recreates particular notions of community, rein-
forced through the institutions of law. It is the distinction and possible disjunction between language
and the institutions of law that present the more serious challenge to this analysis. See infra Section
II.
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accepting or rejecting particular claims. Yet even these acts of judicial
power connect words to relationships, and individuals to other individuals
in complex ways. Judicial acts enable subsequent claims to be made while
also allowing formal and informal resistance to the very boundaries enun-
ciated by the court.103
The invocation of community implied by rights claims does not force
individuals or subcommunities to lose their own boundaries, or to merge
into the larger community. Some rights, as defined in their specific con-
tent, articulate boundaries protecting individuals or groups against con-
nections with others. Rights against assault, for example, such as a child's
right not to be subject to physical abuse, are not exceptions to the notion
of rights as tools of communal dialogue. Historically, these are not excep-
tions but products of precisely the kind of communal inquiry I am sug-
gesting. Through litigation and legislation, such rights have been articu-
lated and enforced. That the particular content of the enforceable right
summons members of the community to respect boundaries within the
community is a commitment to implement the decisions reached through
community discussion. 04 Rights that recognize boundaries underscore
communal ties for it is through reference to each other that we establish
and articulate our boundaries.10 5 When I experience a sense of constraint
because another claims a right, even if I reject the boundary he or she
seeks to draw, I also experience connection to that person, through the
process of mutual recognition.
The language of rights helps people to articulate standards for judging
conduct, and the nature of rights discourse as a language for expressing
meaning persists even beyond its use within legal institutions." 8 In our
103. See, e.g., E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNrTRS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLAGK ACT (1975)
(discussing rights consciousness and people's resistance to law); Forbath, Minow & Hartog, Introduc-
tion: Legal Histories from Below, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 759 (same).
104. Cornell, Should a Marxist Believe in Rights?, 4 PRAXIS INT'L 45 (1984) (discussing
Habermas). Imposition of views, obligations, or rights from authorities above is not communal dis-
course, but even when litigants are essentially submitting to the higher authority of the court, the
litigants' own experiences before the court may help promote a sense of their connections to each
other.
105. Traces of Self-Government, supra note 52, at 32 (discussing "intersubjective" constitution of
individuals in which identities and social involvements are inseparable); see also Cornell, supra note
92, at 360-68.
106. Sartre's and Wittgenstein's notions of language are especially critical to my understanding
here. Sartre describes language, not as a set of rule-bound meanings, but as a mode of human action
and creative self-expression. J.P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 559-707 (H. Barnes trans.
1956). Wittgenstein emphasizes that the meanings of words are determined by their use, and that
their use depends on their context, situated in forms of life, which contributes to a view of language as
necessarily intersubjective and communal. See supra note 73. 1 mean to invoke rights, not merely as
vocabulary, but as a language in the senses implied by Sartre and Wittgenstein. In this manner, I use
the analogy between language and rights much as Fred Dallmayr identifies relations between lan-
guage and politics. F. DALLMAYR, LANGUAGE AND PoxITsCS 174-92 (1984) (language and politics
interact and mutually construct each other); cf. J. KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 112-53
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culture, even children often find rights rhetoric familiar and well-suited to
express their feelings.1"' And people use rights and claims to particular
freedoms or entitlements to refer to what they perceive as their due even
when the formal legal apparatus has not acknowledged or approved of
those perceptions.1 " People speak spontaneously of rights, far from legal
institutions. For example, they make assertions of entitlement, need, and
wants when they collide at the bus stop or on the playground. Children,
no less than adults, can participate in the legal conversation that uses
rights to gain the community's attention. 0 9 If one of the problems with
rights for children is that they expose children's interdependence with
other people-and the conflicts engendered by that interdependence-then
this is a problem for adults as well. 10
Obvious examples of the interdependence of adults arise in the family
context. Even when a conflict is never likely to go to court, adults in a
family reveal their interdependence as they discuss such questions as:
Who will run which errands? Who will take care of the children this
afternoon? Who will have time to be alone? Converting these questions
into conflicting claims of autonomy misses the point that shared lives are
implicated by each question.
When the rights claims reach official attention, the interdependence of
the claimants is no less palpable. An adult woman's right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy without spousal consultation or consent clearly im-
plicates and modifies the claims of the father, or of the potential child.
Similarly, a contrary right of the father to consult or consent would impli-
cate and modify the rights of the mother and of the potential new life.
Whatever the rules, whether they criminalize such conduct or immunize it
from police and prosecutorial action, the law articulates a pattern of rights
that speaks to relationships among individuals even when a particular in-
(1984) (describing development of standards for judging content as part of children's growth). But see
C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE 106-41 (1986) (describing Baptist community's resistance to
rights and preference for harmony and cooperation as their conception of human relationships).
107. See Statement of Alvin Poussaint, Assoc. Prof. of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, in
Television, Children, and t. Constitutional Bicentennial: A Report by Action for Children's Televi-
sion 34-35 (P. Charren & C. Hulsizer eds. 1986): "I think children do understand the idea of equal-
ity and individual rights, but I think a direct connection between their lives and the Constitution has
been missing in the way we educate them . .. .
108. See, e.g., Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 767, 801-17; Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repa-
rations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Williams, supra note 59, at 417 ("Where, how-
ever, one's experience is rooted not just in a 'sense' of illegitimacy but in being illegitimate, in being
raped, and in the fear of being murdered, then the black adherence to a scheme of negative rights-to
the self, to the sanctity of one's own personal boundaries-makes sense.").
109. Both children and adults may need representation by others in this debate, and representa-
tion is problematic, but not uniquely so for children. See infra text accompanying notes 114-19 (dis-
cussing problems of attorney-client relationship).
110. I explore this at greater length in Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 30, at
15-18.
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dividual's right is declared the winning claim. A woman's right to control
her own procreative choice, once announced and enforced by legal author-
ities, remakes a woman's relationships and alters her power, but not be-
cause law has suddenly "intervened" where it previously was absent. The
law always prescribes consequences for particular relationships, even by
its inaction."' 1 In the past, the law intervened by granting legal authority
over procreative decisions to potential fathers and doctors." 2
Similarly, the rights of shareholders implicate their relationships to
management and workers. The rights of trust beneficiaries implicate their
relationships with trustees and donors. Each statement of an individual's
rights implicitly or explicitly draws reference to others, and thus, ex-
presses relationships and interconnections at the very moment that the in-
dividual asserts his or her autonomy. In this respect, children's rights are
no more problematic than adults' rights because all rights claims imply
relationships among members of a community.
A familiar objection to this argument emphasizes differences between
children and adults. I am rejecting here the notion that our society should
answer questions about children's legal status simply by asking how chil-
dren differ from adults. This question wrongly suggests that such differ-
ences are real and discoverable rather than contingent upon social inter-
pretations and choices. According to one interpretation, children are
relatively powerless, and that is why they should be treated differently
than adults. One response to this view is that power itself is a quality of
relationships, not a quantum or a characteristic intrinsic to an isolated
person. Rights language is one type of rhetoric with which to articulate,
challenge, and hold to account relationships of power. Children, no less
than adults, are implicated in these relationships.
Another form of the same view emphasizes the problems of children's
knowledge and competence. We adults do not trust anyone who claims to
speak for a child to represent truly that child's interests in the same way
we trust a representative for a competent adult. A child's representative
may act either as a mouthpiece for a child, who is capable of expressing a
view, or instead as a guardian, who supplies her or his own view of the
child's interest.11" There are immediate grounds to distrust the adult's po-
111. This was a central insight of the legal realists. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11-12 (1927); Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. ScI. Q. 470 (1923).
112. See Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
RF. 933, 946-53 (1985); Olsen, supra note 46.
113. Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Dis-
putes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1138-53 (1978) (discussing alternative roles for
children's attorneys). The problems of defining lawyers' proper roles are rivaled only by the ethical
dilemmas presented when lawyers retreat behind their "roles" to justify their conduct. See Postema,
Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63 (1980); Rhode, Ethical Perspec-
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sition in either circumstance. The adult who offers the child's view, un-
mediated, may advance an irrational or misguided position; the adult who
supplies a preference other than the child's has no obvious tether and
lands in the thicket of general uncertainty about what is good for the
child.
One response is that this charge applies to lawyers representing adult
clients as well.114 The lawyer for the adult who does only what the client
wants may well encounter criticism for failing to advise a different strat-
egy.115 Yet, the lawyer who acts on her or his own view also provokes
criticism from observers.1 6 The problem of distrusting lawyers' interpre-
tations of clients' interests is well-known in public-interest litigation."1
The issue becomes particularly apparent when the lawyer works for a
large organization, like a law firm, that has its own interests, distinct from
those of the clients. 1 Yet the difficulty seems inherent in the legal repre-
sentation of any client:
The problem of insuring that advocates work towards the best inter-
tives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985).
114. This objection also applies to judges. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
115. See, e.g., Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L.Q. 219, 224-34 (1982)
(risks to clienL when left without independent legal advice); Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Profes-
sional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV.
503 (1985) (arguing that there is little evidence that corporate lawyers serve to restrain and challenge
clients' actions); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975)
(role-differentiated character of lawyers' situations alters relevant moral point of view); cf Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888 (1984) (dis-
cussing inducement of corporation members to act as gatekeepers monitoring corporate wrongdoing).
116. The most elaborate criticism appears in discussions of class actions. See Bell, Serving Two
Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J.
470 (1976); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982). Yet charges
have been levied against lawyers representing individual adult clients as well. See, e.g., Burt, Conflict
and Trus, n Attorney and Client, 69 CEO. L.J. 1015 (1981) (discussing distrust in attorney-
client relatio. ); Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454 (discuss-
ing when pat. alism is and is not justified); see also Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations o, the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (responding to charges that
lawyer's role as advocate incompatible with moral values).
117. Some may argue that adult clients in public-interest litigation can hire and fire, and there-
fore control, their attorneys. See Mnookin, The Paradox of Child Advocacy, in IN THE INTEREST OF
CHILDREN, supra note 30, at 53-55. This hardly seems compelling when the client group is large and
individual members have little control, when the litigation is complex and not easily explained to
clients, or when the members of a class action have potential conflicts. See id. at 54.
118. See Nelson, supra note 115, at 465 (institutional factors at both law firm and societal levels
influence lawyers' representation of clients); Food For Thought: Case Study, Harvard Program on the
Legal Profession (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (exploring lawyer's conflicting con-
cerns with firm's reputation in Food and Drug work and needs of particular client); see also D.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 96-105 (1974) (discussing conflict between
lawyer's financial interests and client's interests); Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence
Game, I LAW & Soc', REV. 15 (1967) (conflicts between criminal defense lawyers' ongoing commit-
ment to organization of criminal process and obligations to particular client).
1889
The Yale Law Journal
ests of the client is inherent in any system which uses counsel to
represent clients. Where one party is given the authority to put for-
ward another's interests, there is always the danger that the agent
will not be faithful to the interests of his client. The agent may have
misperceived what the client wanted. The agent may believe some-
thing to be in the client's interests when it actually is not. Finally,
wherever power is delegated, there is always the potential and incen-
tive for the agent to put his own interests ahead of those of his client.
These problems infect almost every human relationship.'
Children are often less articulate and less self-knowing than adults, but
these qualities need not render them peculiarly vulnerable within a legal
system. If there are reasons to distrust legal representatives of children,
there are reasons to distrust legal representatives of adults, and con-
fronting both kinds of distrust may demand more, not less, legal conversa-
tion. Courts could appoint multiple representatives to offer contrasting
views of children's rights and interests,' or else demand fuller explora-
tion by the initial representatives of the range of interests potentially in-
volved in the litigation. The court has long been assigned the special task
of guarding the interests of children in litigation; what may be missing are
practical steps to prepare the court to fulfill this job.
There is a second objection to conceiving of children's rights and adults'
rights as similar. Children's economic, physical, and emotional depen-
dence on adults seem different in scale than adults' needs. Articulating
children's interests in terms of rights arguably risks undermining the rela-
tionships through which those needs are usually met. 2 ' This objection
assumes that children would be better off if schools and families were
removed from the purview of public scrutiny permitted by rights claims.
Although I would readily agree that public review itself may damage
some children and disturb the adults who care for them,' 22 there often are
119. Mnookin, supra note 117, at 54.
120. See Chambers & Wald, supra note 64, at 144 (recommending appointment of additional
counsel to offer contrasting perspectives in test case litigation involving children).
121. Alternatively, expressing the needs of children through rights rhetoric presents greater diffi-
culties in setting limits on those claims than do adults' claims. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 597
(1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (difficulty drawing lines for children's rights); Burt, supra note 84, at
265. This objection, however, stems from a mistaken view that rights have defined limits, which has
hardly been the case in other areas, such as toxic tort and prison reform litigation. In those contexts,
as in legal challenges to foster care, institutional treatment, and other systems handling (and mishan-
dling) children, the legal processes of argument, negotiation, and monitoring can orchestrate claims
and remedies.
122. See Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potential for Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM. JUST.
J. 1 (1983) (discussing potential harms to child from participation in prosecution); Myers, The Legal
Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children?, 24 J. FAM. L. 149 (1985-1986) ("goal of
protecting children often disserved by litigation"); cf S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) (harm to adult
rape victim imposed by criminal justice system); Nemeth, Legal Emancipation for the Victim of Rape,
11 HUM. RTS. 30 (1984) (same).
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more serious risks to children if the adults who care for them are free
from public review. 2 ' When the state deems "at risk" individual children
who are disproportionately members of minority racial groups and the
poorest sectors of the society, claims of rights on their behalf represent
efforts to rectify larger social patterns that damage people.' The image
of rights as damaging and weighty instruments that should be reserved for
adults is only one possible conception of rights. My alternative conception
emphasizes rights as a language that can express and remake patterns of
all relationships.'25
As a language recognized by official legal institutions, rights rhetoric
bears traditional meanings, but it is capable of carrying new meanings.
Even rights as rules represent past legal consequences, or asserted conse-
quences, of certain existing social, economic, and political relationships.
The struggle among competing groups, and the struggle to establish affili-
ations away from and perhaps different than those of the majority, present
larger questions of relationships in terms of rights. What rights and pat-
terns of rights can protect groups when their norms conflict with those
countenanced or enforced by the official legal system? 26 These are among
the most difficult questions for a diverse and discordant society, but, in
addressing them, rights discourse has proven to be both pliant and
meaningful.
D. Why Talk About Rights, Anyway?
Why advance this conception of rights, including children's rights, as a
vocabulary used by community members to interpret and reinterpret their
123. The rates of child abuse are difficult to estimate, but observers now agree that the problem is
widespread, and relatives and friends, not strangers to the child, are by far the most common perpe-
trators. See Conte, The Justice System and Sexual Abuse of Children, 58 Soc. SERVicE REV. 556,
557-58 (1984) (reporting one study in which 38% of adult women respondents reported that they had
been sexually abused as minors and another study where 47% of perpetrators are members of child's
own family and 42% are known to child but are not family members); Fuller, Child Abuse Rises, 72
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1986, at 34 (reporting study estimating 1.793 million abused and neglected children in
1985); ten Bensel, The Scope of the Problem, 35 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 1-2 (1984) (estimating that
under broad definition 4 to 5 million children per year are neglected and/or abused, and noting
dramatic increase in reporting of sexual abuse).
124. See Solnit, Children, Parents, and the State, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 496, 501-04
(1982) (critique of increased state intervention into family life through mandated reporting of child
abuse and refusals by state to return children whom parents initially placed voluntarily with state);
see also Krisberg & Schwartz, Rethinking Juvenile Justice, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 333 (1983) (sum-
marizing data and policy developments in juvenile justice); Pope & Feyerherm, Race and Juvenile
Court Dispositions: An Examination of Initial Screening Decisions, 8 CRIM. JUsT. & BEHAV. 287
(1981) (study of racial impact of juvenile court practices).
125. Cf M. BALL, supra note 21, at 132-33 (rejecting conception of courtrooms as setting for
battle and replacing it with metaphors of theatre, dance, and dialogue).
126. See Nomos and Narrative, supra note 23, at 60-68; Levinson, Constituting Communities
Through Words That Bind: Reflections on Loyalty Oaths, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1440, 1447-48,
1454-56 (1986).
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relationships with one another? This conception responds both to those
who criticize newly articulated rights for lacking objective foundations and
to those who criticize rights for their analytic indeterminacy. By analogiz-
ing rights to language, and treating rights as a particular vocabulary im-
plying roles and relationships within communities and institutions, this
approach suggests how rights can be something-without being fixed, and
can change-without losing their legitimacy.12
Rights are hardly neutral. With them, we pick from among a variety of
possible legal consequences for human relationships, and thereby influ-
ence the pattern of existing and future relationships.128 Moreover, the in-
terpretive turn, as described in this essay, pins law not on some force
beyond human control,12 9 but on human responsibility for the patterns of
127. Ball quotes Thomas Reed Powell, who in turn quoted one James Beck, on a metaphor for
the Constitution that struggled similarly to conceive of law somewhere between fixity and fluidity:
'The Constitution is neither, on the one hand, a Gibraltar rock, which wholly resists the cease-
less washing of time and circumstance, nor is it, on the other hand, a sandy beach, which is
slowly destroyed by the erosion of the waves. It is rather to be likened to a floating dock,
which, while firmly attached to its moorings, and not therefore at the caprice of the waves, yet
rises and falls with the tide of time and circumstance.'
M. BALL, supra note 21, at 18 (quoting Powell, Constitutional Metaphors (Book Review), NEw
REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 1925, at 314); see also R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 126-30 (1975) [hereinafter
JUSTICE ACCUSED] (discussing language and rules). Cover notes:
There are those who speak law-language poorly-whose departures from the rules will not
live; who reflect neither the wave of the future to be washed into prophecy by the acceptance of
the masses nor the compelling idiosyncratic departure of the master, which will pull the masses
after it. Others-the vast majority-speak according to the rules, for the rules are largely
derived from such as these. They depart occasionally, usually inadvertently. Then there are
prophets and masters who move the law more than their democratic, per-capita share. Either
they evoke the response: "This is what we've known or wanted all along, but never before so
articulated." Or they strike the chord: "We've rejected or never thought of this before, but your
argument compels attention, even conviction."
Id. at 128. And:
When there is a departure from the rules, however, that which determines whether the rules
have been changed is not so much another rule determining changes in rules as it is the accept-
ance of the change by others over time. In this respect the language analogy is far better than
the extended game analogy [as a way to understand law].
Id.
128. Claims of rights that call for negotiation, consultation and, indeed, discussion as ways to
handle disputes cannot be neutral: They call for recognition of each disputant by the other. When the
Children's Hearings Project in Cambridge, Massachusetts receives parental complaints diverted by the
Juvenile Court about "unruly" children, the Project staff creates opportunities for parents and their
children to negotiate contractual agreements to resolve their disputes, and to establish procedures for
future disputes. This non-neutral approach demands that the parents take their children's complaints
as seriously as their own, even though the particular contracts negotiated by the family members
depend upon their own views, not those of the Project staff. S. MERRY & A. ROCHELEAU, MEDIA-
TION IN FAMILIES: A STUDY OF THE CHILDREN'S HEAPING PROJECT 91-101 (1985).
129. See J. NOONAN, The Antelope: The Ordeal of the Recaptured Africans, in THE ADMINIS-
TRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 159 (1977):
Those who suppose that the legal system is a self-subsistent set of rules existing outside of its
participants and constraining lawyers and judges to act against their consciences will always be
prevalent among lawyers, judges and legal historians. . . . But every so often in a human
heart the ice will crack, and a human person will acknowledge his responsibility for other
human persons he has touched.
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rights and rules that emerge from legal discourse and from the human
relationships promoted or hindered by this process. In this way, the notion
of rights as tools in continuing, communal discourse helps to locate re-
sponsibility in human beings for legal action and inaction."' The inter-
pretive framework seeks to reinvest legal activity with a believable aspira-
tion to create communal meaning amid a world scarred by justifiable
skepticism."'
II. COVER'S CHALLENGE: Violence and the Word
[Truth] excludes the use of violence because man is not capable of
knowing the absolute truth and therefore is not competent to
punish.
-Gandhi..2
The townspeople perceive the equation of word and law, how Joe's
big voice commands obedience: "You kin feel a switch in his hand
when he's talkin' to yuh."
-Elizabeth Meese 3 '
Robert Cover described the "recent explosion of legal scholarship plac-
ing interpretation at the crux of the enterprise of law."1 ' 4 Indeed, his own
work eloquently portrays legal scholarship as the study of a "normative
universe . . . held together by . . .interpretive commitments. ' 13 5 I have
relied on Cover's work as exemplary of the ways people elaborate norma-
tive commitments through interpretive activities.13 6 Yet, in an essay pub-
lished after his death, Cover raised a warning that should chill those of us
who are taken with the interpretive turn in law. He warned that an inter-
pretive stance fails to acknowledge that "[1]egal interpretation takes place
in a field of pain and death." ' When judges interpret texts, "somebody
130. A similar purpose animates another work by John Noonan, who took three cases and probed
beneath the labels of legal analysis and roles to find the persons and lines of responsibility routinely
suppressed. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW, supra note 80; see also J. NOONAN,
supra note 129; JUSTICE ACCUSED, supra note 127 (exploring jurisprudential and psychological rea-
sons why judges opposed to slavery nonetheless enforced Fugitive Slave Laws).
131. Cover described interpretive work as "an attempt to hold a worthy ideal before what all
would agree is an unredeemed reality." Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1628.
132. Quoted in E. ERIKSON, GANDHI'S TRUTH 241 (1969).
133. E. MEESE, CROSSING THE DOUBLE-CROSS: THE PRACTICE OF FEMINIST CRITICISM 46-47
(1986) (quoting Zora Neale Hurston) (discussing Z. HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING
GOD 602 (1978)).
134. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1601-02 n.2.
135. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 23, at 7.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
137. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1601.
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loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life."1"8 Judicial
interpretation often supplies rationales for violence that has occurred or
will occur.'3" Legal scholars interested in interpretation systematically ig-
nore or suppress how law is steeped in violence and social control.1 4° "A
legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments that
place bodies on the line." ' 1 Official power effectuates itself in physical
force, threatened or carried out. Human responses to that force also ex-
press interpretations, including compliance to rebellion, resistance, and
martyrdom. Steeped in the state's own violence even in responding to it,
resistance and martyrdom are interpretive acts, creating normative worlds
with legal consequences. But these acts are ignored in accounts of law as
interpretation. Fundamentally, law embeds interpretations of political
texts in institutions that exercise the state's monopoly over legitimate vio-
lence: Law organizes not just meaning, but also power. 42 Thus, legal
scholars should pay attention not only to judicial rhetoric, but also to judi-
cial action, to the real effects of judicial action, and to the ways that legal
language and meaning are inescapably bonded to institutionally imple-
mented deeds.143
Cover is right. His is a devastating and haunting insight. Judges may
use words and interpret texts, but their words organize and justify official
acts of power. Those acts hurt some people and help others. The threat
and fact of the force behind judicial acts shatter the image of normative
community and nurturing dialogue embraced by interpretive legal scholar-
ship. The rhetoric, uttered amidst the wielding of power, makes more
palatable what might otherwise have been noxious.'
44
Cover's challenge alters the terms of the debate and for someone, like
me, who is drawn to the interpretive turn, his challenge forces reconsider-
ation and reevaluation. Legal scholars may have turned to the interpretive
frame, which holds up a vision of communal efforts to create meaning, in
an effort to demystify law and to rid it of its aura of objectivity. The
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1602 n.2.
141. Id. at 1605.
142. Id. at 1602 n.2, 1605. This insight also may explain Cover's fascination with the intriguing
possibility of severing the link between law's normative dimension and its organization of power, as in
the creation of courts without official authority. See Folhtales of Justice, supra note 25, at 200-02.
143. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1609, 1617-18; see also The Bonds of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, supra note 7, at 817-31 (describing institutional framework within which judi-
cial violence must take place).
144. The use of law to legitimate the exercise of power has been the subject of much scholarly
discussion, see, e.g., E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 25-49 (1974); D. HAY, Property, Author-
ity and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CEN-
TURY ENGLAND 17, 56-63 (1975); M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 222-33 (1958); E.P.
THOMPSON, supra note 103, at 258-69, and some scholarly dispute, see Hyde, The Concept of Legiti-
mation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 379.
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interpretive frame, however, poses the danger of a new mystification, one
that casts an aura of cozy conversation over official acts of domination and
control.145 This new mystification is dangerous if it obscures an insight
that, as Cover explains, has been exposed by many social scientists, if not
by history itself: "Persons who act within social organizations that exer-
cise authority act violently without experiencing the normal inhibitions or
the normal degree of inhibition which regulates the behavior of those who
act autonomously." 4 The ways individuals grow numb to their own ex-
ercises of power and infliction of pain may be especially pronounced when
they act in roles that "separate[] the act of interpretation-of understand-
ing what ought to be done-from the carrying out of this 'ought to be
done' through violence."1 47 For example, our legal system assigns one per-
son to impose a criminal sentence and another to implement it.' 48 The
involvement of so many official actors actually may limit the state's exer-
cise of violence: "[N]o single mind and no single will can generate the
violent outcomes that follow from interpretive commitments."' 49
Nonetheless, applying the language of interpretation to legal action
poses a danger of "exaggerating the extent to which any interpretation
rendered as part of the act of state violence can ever constitute a common
145. Cover notes that violence is intrinsic to the practice of law and government. For example,
there is no need to authorize government to practice violence. In addition, powers of violence are
explicitly granted to governments by texts, such as the "Power to . . . provide for the common De-
fence," U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and the power "To provide for the Punishment of counterfeit-
ing," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1610 n.22.
146. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1615 (discussing work of Stanley Milgram, Anna
Freud, and Konrad Lorenz); see Traces of Self-Government, supra note 52, at 14-16, 35, 76; Sloan,
Death Row Clerk, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 16, 1987, at 18 (describing death penalty work of Supreme
Court Justices and their clerks).
147. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1627; see Traces of Self-Government, supra note
52:
Clearly, then, adoption of the imperial stance with respect to a particular case, or kind of case,
can and therefore ought to be a judicially responsible act. Still there remains in that stance,
whenever adopted, some element of flight from responsibility or from what Robert Cover
called "commitment." "Objective" legal standards seem to absolve judges of responsibility for
the fates of individual parties. "Neutral" legal standards seem to absolve their promul-
gators-sometimes the very judges who apply them-of responsibility for their contributions to
socially unequal or conflictual outcomes. Accordingly, a judge's commitment to imperial re-
sponsibility also involves a certain withholding of commitment. In this circumstance lies the
pathos of the judicial role, and its irony, which Robert Cover expressed in the ironic label he
gave it: "The jurispathic office."
Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
148. Even beyond institutional roles and separations of functions, law legitimates a flight from
responsibility by giving "deference" to decisions made by those in power and by relying on language
so formal and distant that what is at stake remains far from view. In linguistic sleights-of-hand,
lawyers and judges invent fictions to persuade and to disguise what they do, and legal scholars justify
the "utility" of these tactics. The master work is still probably L. FULLER, LEGAL FiCTbONS (1967),
reprintedfromn Fuller, Legal Fictions (pts. 1-3), 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513, 877 (1930-1931). For a
probing inquiry into the subject, see Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871 (1986).
149. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1628; see THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison)
(separation of governmental powers in departments with means to resist encroachment by others as
design for promoting liberty).
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and coherent meaning."' 50 The language of interpretation pretends that
judges and litigants share a world, when in fact judicial authority irradi-
cably divides their worlds. Cover also warns that interpretive rhetoric is
especially dangerous if it hides differences or papers over clashes between
normative commitments in and between communities in the name of state
authority. An equivalent danger arises if interpretive rhetoric smooths
away the gripping points of leverage against official power, eliminating
the contrasting rhetoric of fundamental social conflict, class warfare, and
the state's hegemonic power. An interpretive turn emphasizing communal
connections in the acts of interpretation risks washing away these points
of external critique by implying an internal commonality, or by scoffing at
charges of exclusion with assertions of universal inclusion. Thus, the very
way that interpretation responds to charges that law creates conflict-the
response that involves communality-may obscure enduring conflicts
within and beyond a legal dispute.
What, then, are the consequences of Violence and the Word for inter-
pretive legal scholarship? Cover interprets his own message as at once
partially reassuring and perpetually disturbing. On the one hand:
It would not be better were there only a community of argument, of
readers and writers of texts, of interpreters. As long as death and
pain are part of our political world, it is essential that they be at the
center of the law. The alternative is truly unacceptable-that they be
within our polity but outside the discipline of the collective decision




And on the other:
[A]s long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as
well as meaning, as long as people are committed to using or re-
sisting the social organizations of violence in making their interpreta-
tions real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning
that can be achieved.
1 52
Because law involves state control over organized violence, legal inter-
pretation is inextricably entwined with violence. Because people seek to
make their own meanings real in terms governed by officially organized
forms of violence, legal translations of interpersonal and group conflict are
inevitably bound up with violence. And because these patterns gird mean-
150. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1628.
151. Id.; see The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 7, at 827.
152. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1629.
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ing-making with violence, common meaning, truly shared, can never be
attained. Violence inevitably constitutes law and the conflicts in law's
arenas. With every effort not to blink at this reality, I intend to consider
the broad inquiry that Cover's work opens into the relations between vio-
lence and law. His inquiry does not require abandoning the interpretive
framework but instead invites us to aim it, steadily, critically, toward the
connection between meanings and power. 53 In this sense, I mean to pur-
sue the insights of Violence and the Word further, and to pursue them
with an interpretive method exemplified by Robert Cover's work, even if
this method challenges, or misinterprets, aspects of his claims.
A. The Meanings of Violence
It is dangerous to disguise the violence actually commanded and sanc-
tioned by law with the rhetoric of justification offered by judges, scholars,
and other interpreters. Yet, it is also dangerous to treat all legal meanings
as reducible to state organized violence. The contexts of violence and the
relationships among actors and agencies imbue official power with vari-
eties of meanings. In particular, the meaning of violence changes when it
is used to challenge other violence.
Some legal interpretations help people place limits on government
power. Granted that each recourse to law, in some fundamental way, re-
confirms the power of the state,15 the creation of normative language to
rationalize the exercise of state power can redound to support human
pressures to limit that power. 1 55 Legal language has force. It both triggers
and justifies power. But precisely because language is not identical to
power, people may at times use it as a brace against power.1 56 Whatever
153. Interpretation, as I mean it here, should be practiced as a critical, that is, self-critical, theory.
See R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY (1981) (developing critical theory); M. RYAN,
MARXISM AND DECONSTRUCTION (1982) (same); J. THOMPSON, CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS: A
STUDY IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL RICOEUR AND JURGEN HABERMAS (1981) (same); M. WALZF,
INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987) (same).
154. See, e.g., Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory
and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 375 (1982-1983); Kennedy,
Critical Labor Law Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 503, 504 (1981). But see Fiss, Why the
State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987) (arguing that state involvement in enforcing First Amendment
is only alternative to dangers of oppression of many by the few).
155. Similarly, a parent who offers a justification for action supplies the child with a basis for
challenging future action: "But you said . .. ."
156. There is a debate about what kind of independent constraining power is ever produced by
legal-or moral-rhetoric invented or invoked to justify power's exercise. Compare, C. REMBAR, THE
LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM 212 (1980) (common law enabled
king to enlarge royal jurisdiction-but common law also constrained king "because the supremacy of
the common law [was] a supremacy over everyone, including the monarch himself. The kings had
made a monster that devoured them.") with M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 226-27 (1958)
(language of morality accompanies power in all complex societies, but hardly survives with
independence).
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action follows a judicial decision, the decision and its rationale, unlike
brute force, allow for later interpretation and reinterpretation. The mean-
ings set in motion by justificatory legal language add meanings to judicial
violence and even provide vantage points for criticizing it.
Judicial violence can mean the force and power used to effectuate state
regulation. Some of that violence may destroy private activities or private
meanings-but, as Cover wrote, "[viery often the balance of terror in this
regard is just as I would want it."' 5 Some judicial violence may reinforce
patterns of domination and exclusion otherwise persisting in society. Here,
the meanings of judicial violence take on the prejudices of private factions.
Thus, the violence ordered by the state takes on different meanings in
different contexts.
Moreover, judicial inaction can be violent.1 58 Thus, it would be a mis-
take to treat judicial inaction as always preferable to judicial action.
Judges do violence when they fail to respond to suspected spouse or child
abuse for fear of disrupting-doing violence to-family bonds. Judges do
violence when they leave in place a neglectful system for providing substi-
tute care when parents fail, and expose dependent children to physical
and emotional damage.1 59 The focus on judicial acts as the link between
legal meaning and legal violence should not obscure the continuing pres-
ence of legal control and state-approved force in the lives of both children
and adults. Violence condoned by the state and ordered by the state may
differ, but interpreting the meaning of either discloses the shared fact of
violence.
Private authorities also exercise power and violence. The meanings of
private violence, too, can and must be interpreted; such interpretation can
expose the violence that has been hidden under other labels. Some actions
by parents, husbands, school officials, creditors, gangs, murderers, and
corporate managers are, under analysis, undeniably violent.'60 But, the
157. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1608. Cover continued: "But I do not wish us to
pretend that we talk our prisoners into jail." Id.
158. Cover is attentive to this in his Georgia essay, but he also emphasizes the citizen's deeds as
necessarily violent actions that convey meanings .capable of interpretation:
In law to be an interpreter is to be a force, an actor who creates effects even though or in the
face of violence. To stop short of suffering or imposing violence is to give law up to those who
are willing to so act. The state is organized to overcome scruple and fear. Its officials will so
act. All others are merely petitioners if they will not fight back.
The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 7, at 833.
159. See, e.g., K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S INCARCER-
ATED CHILDREN 47-57 (1976) (describing Charles Manson's harrowing journey through temporary
custody arrangements and institutions during childhood).
160. See Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 451 (1920) (exploring
power wielded by private parties imposing constraints like those imposed by public power); Lynd,
Towards a Not-for-Profit Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition and Use of In-
dustrial Property, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 13, 16-24 (1987) (describing devastation of commu-
nities by plant shut-downs).
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private contexts, and symbolic meanings of these actions may obscure how
such people commit violence, and whom they victimize. Children are, all
too often, the unnamed victims. Parents, teachers, neighbors, and strangers
exercise physical and emotional control over children and sometimes do
great violence to them. These authorities often abuse, neglect, or otherwise
injure children while acting within the very communities that Cover, and
I, would value for their ability to generate normative commitments away
from the state.1" 1 Cover's exploration of the organization of power and
meaning is pertinent not just to law, but also to other realms where au-
thority is exercised such as families, religious communities, and schools."62
Other kinds of private violence represent responses to state power and
state actions. In the midst of political and social struggles, acts of violence
to property and even to persons can carry meanings that advance new
normative commitments, meanings that may be the roots of new rights. In
part, these private acts of violence must be judged in the same way as
official violence. The judgments, in each case, should include (but not stop
with) efforts to interpret the meanings of the violence for those affected.
Potentially violent dimensions of private power can accompany efforts to
make new meanings, even meanings that may be relevant for criticizing
public power.
At the same time, public officials may engage in interpretive activities
that challenge exercises of private power. In so doing, they generate norms
that alter the meanings of the public power. "When they oppose the vio-
lence and coercion of the other organs of the state, judges begin to look
more like the other jurisgenerative communities of the world," Cover
wrote.163 Historical and social contexts matter in interpreting the mean-
ings of public and private violence. To interpret these meanings, we
should ask: To what does the violence respond? What symbolic and ex-
pressive meanings may it carry? How would inaction leave other sources
of violence unchallenged?
To explore the meanings of violence is to recognize that words and
thoughts help constitute the world. This does not mean forgetting how the
161. See Curry & Riley, Notes on Church-State Affairs, 26 J. CHURCH & STATE 561, 587-88
(1984) (state intervention into internal affairs of Northeast Kingdom Community Church on charges
of child abuse); Note, House of Judah: The Problem of Child Abuse and Neglect in Communes and
Cults, 18 U. MICH. J.L. Rr. 1089 (1985) (state involvement within religious cult on charges of child
abuse and neglect).
162. Along these lines, Roberto Unger has written:
[T]he family is a structure of power, ennobled by sentiment. Both as sentiment and as power,
it repudiates the rule of law. Were the family mere sentiment, it would disintegrate, for ac-
cording to this outlook sentiment is precarious and formless. Were the family brute power,
unsoftened by sentiment, it might not merit preservation. The redemptive union of authority
and affection provides the alternative to legal or at least to contractual ordering.
Unger, supra note 25, at 624.
163. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 23, at 57-58.
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real facts of violence rip apart and destroy parts of the world. To explore
the meanings of violence is to wager that violence itself is made more and
less possible by patterns of meaning; that certain kinds of people become
victims of violence, in part, because social meanings fail to constrain that
violence; and that violence committed in the name of the state can, in part,
be understood, and maybe channeled, through vigilant attention to its
meanings.
Heightened efforts to expose violence and to develop more articulate
understandings of its public and private forms are risky. There are risks
in peeling away the cultural meanings of public and private authority
from raw acts of violence. There are risks that authority will not be able
to claim so ready obedience. There are risks of disturbing seemingly set-
tled understandings about what power is, who has it, and who does
not-and risks of new kinds of fights about the meanings of power and
violence. But we must take these risks. Naming violence inside and
outside the courtroom bears witness to it and preserves the possibility of
judging it. Legal rhetoric, legal norms separated from the particular in-
stances of their announcement, can help name and challenge both public
and private violence. "Law connects 'reality' to alternity constituting a
new reality with a bridge built out of committed social behavior."' 6
B. The Power of Meanings
Violence and the Word reminds us, relentlessly, that words do not erase
violence. Judicial words may sanitize or domesticate violence. But after a
judicial decision, people are thrown in prison, ordered to sell their busi-
nesses, forced to give up their children, or sentenced to lose their lives.
Words should not disguise these facts. But nor should these facts disguise
the power of words. There can be an important difference between legal
interpretation and violence committed in law's name. Because we use legal
symbols to make meaning, our interpretations of these symbols can chal-
lenge other kinds of power. Legal language itself is powerful.' 5
Language unconnected with official power can do violence. Pornogra-
phy can devalue particular individuals. It can link sexual intimacy with
164. Folktales of Justice, supra note 25, at 181 (footnote omitted).
165. Cf M. EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT
FAIL (1977) (exploring how language influences public policy and politics); M. FOUCAULT, The Dis-
course on Language, in THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 215 app. (1972) (discussing how dis-
course shapes consciousness and implements authority); D. Stone, The Strategic Uses of Causation in
Problem Definition 2 (unpublished paper presented at Conference on Problem Definition in Public
Policy, Brown University, Oct. 16-18, 1986) (defining "problem definition" as a struggle among
political actors to control interpretations and symbols); see also L. IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS
NOT ONE (C. Porter trans. 1985) (effort to replace male-centered language and thought); P.
MEDVEDEV & M. BAKHTIN, THE FORMAL METHOD IN LITERARY SCHOLARSHIP (A. Werhle trans.
1978) (language as field of ideological contention yet not reducible to material interests).
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brutality, and incite violence directly or indirectly.' 66 Labels assigned by
medical professionals can consign individuals to the scorn of others, and to
the physical and emotional abuse that may follow.' 67 When children are
involved, the use of words by adults may impose direct or indirect vio-
lence. A school may label a child on the basis of educational and medical
tests, with devastating consequences for the child's self-esteem, future suc-
cess, and vulnerability to abuse by peers.' 68 Child pornography subjects
individual children to actual violence and also uses their images to damage
and devalue all children.16 These are simply examples of the general
point. Rhetoric is linked to action and power.170
166. See Hommel, Images of Women in Pornography and Media, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 207 (1978-1979); Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of
Pornography, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1984); Pornography: Social Science, Legal, and Clinical
Perspectives, 4 LAW & INEQUALITY 17 (1986) (symposium); Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L. REV. 589; Zillmann & Bryant, Pornography, Sexual Callousness and
the Trivialization of Rape, 32 J. COMM. 10 (1982). But see Making Sense of Research on Pornogra-
phy, in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 181 app. (V. Burstyn ed. 1985) (listing alternative views).
The circuit court that rejected the Indiana pornography ordinance nonetheless acknowledged that
"[diepictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status of women in
turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery and rape on the
streets." American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (1985) (holding that Indianapolis
pornography ordinance violates First Amendment). The court added: "In saying that we accept the
finding that pornography as the ordinance defines it leads to unhappy consequences, we mean only
that there is evidence to this effect, that this evidence is consistent with much human experience, and
that as judges we must accept the legislative resolution of such disputed empirical questions." Id. at
329 n.2. See generally Russell, Pornography and Violence: What Does the New Research Say?, in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 218 (L. Lederer ed. 1980) (reviewing studies);
Selected Bibliography on Pornography and Violence, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 652, 658-60 (1979) (list-
ing studies of pornography and violence).
167. T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 87 (1966) (persons once labeled are forced into social
role that produces ostracism); S. GOULD, THE MISMASURE OF MAN 158-233 (1981) (discussing
sterilization and mistreatment of people labeled mentally retarded); Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2
CONST. COMMENTARY 331 (1985) (same). Labelling theory suggests that changes in public attitudes
about the labeled condition dramatically affect the consequences of labeling. See Gove, Labelling and
Mental Illness: A Critique, in THE LABELLING OF DEVIANCE 85-86 (W. Gove 2d ed. 1980) (chang-
ing public attitudes toward mental illness and treatment reduce victimization as result of labelling).
See generally Minow, When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 15 (discussing labelling theory and
alternative approaches to treatment of difference).
168. J. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAU-
CRACY 80-82 (1986) (urging use of functional labels for special education because disability labels
have potentially harmful effects on children and do not link to specific programs). See generally THE
LABELLING OF DEVIANCE supra note 167 (W. Gove 2d ed. 1980) (evaluating sociological theory of
labelling, under which assignment of deviant label itself can injure); R. PAGE, STIGMA (1984) (ex-
ploring concept of stigma in relation to assigned labels).
169. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
legislation against child pornography and citing studies of harm to children); see also S. O'BRIEN,
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (1983) (reviewing prevalence, information on perpetrators, symptoms, and ef-
fects on children); cf. Cline, Croft & Courrier, The Desensitization of Children to TV Violence, in
WHERE Do YOU DRAW THE LINE? 147 (V. Cline ed. 1974) (effects of watching violence on chil-
dren's attitudes).
170. This is at least in part because people use language to express themselves to wield and
challenge authority. Even highly technical elaborations of linguistic theory and literary theory mani-
fest and enact power struggles. See generally F. DALLMAYR, supra note 106; T. EAGLETON, LrrER-
ARY THEORY (1983); M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 78-108 (C. Gordon ed. 1980). Another
view emphasizes that people create themselves and their own meanings through the particular lan-
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In each of these instances, a reinterpretation of existing legal claims has
effectively challenged prevailing practices. Public prosecutors have investi-
gated disciplinary practices by parents and religious communities;17' liti-
gators and legislators have devised participatory procedures to control the
assignment of labels to students;1" 2 and legal challenges have successfully
restricted child pornography 17" and exclusions from educational opportu-
nities.17 1 Interpretive work, examining relationships countenanced or ig-
nored by law, can provide critical handles on the violence done to chil-
dren. Public force assaulting private force is still force, but norms invoked
publicly can expose both kinds of violence to scrutiny and debate.
The rights claims mounted in each context may themselves trigger vio-
lence. Certainly, public investigations, mandated procedures, and bans on
commercial activity do limit individual freedoms, sometimes excessively,
and sometimes wrongly. But the choice in each case is not between vio-
lence and no violence, but between private violence and public violence.
Reworking a theme developed earlier in this essay, I suggest that rights
rhetoric does not create conflict, but rather accompanies the public vio-
lence used to challenge private violence. In this way, law may shift the
balance of power in an already violent situation. By summoning the possi-
bility of communal commitments in the face of genuine community divi-
sions, rights claims also introduce something beyond violence. By speaking
of all these things, we expose both legal violence and extra-legal violence
for what they are, and by speaking, we enlarge a human capacity to be
what we could be.175 Language "exists only within a 'differential' world,
a world of conflicts and oppositions.' 176 Language not only can express
and confirm power but also can challenge and claim it.
1 7"
guage they use. See, e.g., Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming) (1987); see
also L. WITTGENsTFIN, BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 25-27 (1958) (describing difficulties with viewing
language as involving application of rules).
171. See supra note 161.
172. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Education of the Handicapped
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982); see also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
173. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
174. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (refusing tax subsidy for univer-
sity practicing racial discrimination); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
175. See H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 175-81 (1958) (speaking makes us more
human).
176. R. TERDIMAN, DIScOuRSE/CoUNTER-DIsCOURSE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SYM-
BOLIC RESISTANCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 15 (1985).
177. The significance to oppressed groups of reclaiming language is a topic of wide discussion.
See, e.g., B. HooKs, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); THE (M)OTHER
TONGUE: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION (S. Garner, C. Kahane & M.
Sprengnether eds. 1985). A significant power of language is to name oneself and one's experience. P.
FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 11, 88, 119 (1970). "Human existence cannot be silent, nor
can it be nourished by false words, but only by true words, with which men transform the world. To
exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it." Id. at 76. This insight has meant much to women
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In arguing that the power of language can be harnessed to challenge
even the violence of official state power, I am encouraged by the example
in Cover's Violence and the Word of the power of words to challenge
indifference toward official violence. 7 Cover's essay offers an avenue for
exposing violence and developing more articulate understandings of it.
Cover highlights the points of connection between judicial acts that create
legal meaning, and judicial acts that set in motion instruments of official
violence. Further exploration of these points of connection could melt the
numbness induced when lawyers separate interpretation and implementa-
tion. The judge depends on the cooperation of the police, warden, and
prison guard, even as they, in turn, depend on the judge for the legitimacy
of the force they exercise. Legal scholars could detail these processes of
interdependence, showing how individuals in the system each go home at
night feeling relatively powerless, yet wield enormous power together.
Words about the meanings of violence can sharpen angles of criticism,
rouse vigilance, and support acts of witness that could better hold those in
power to account.
Similarly, scholars could seek to hold authorities to account, and pro-
mote bases for resistance, by nurturing aspirations to develop normative
commitments through official interpretive acts. Building the repository of
rhetoric endorsed by state power can enlarge the resources available to
challenge such power, even when that rhetoric is initially "bonded" to acts
of domination and to the instruments implementing such power."' 9 Once
constructed and officially embraced, normative language can become loos-
ened from its past uses, and turned around to limit its authors, if only
through their own shamed or courageous self-restraint. 80 Dworkin seems
to have this in mind when he describes how "interpretation is in part a
matter of justice" because it subjects well-established practices to critical
assessment in view of changed conditions. 8
Gandhi, for example, appealed to the norms of conduct enunciated by
as well as to men. See Z. HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD (1937); Le Guin, She
Unnames Them, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 1985, at 27 (Eve unnames all that Adam named, and
liberates creatures). See generally J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW, supra note 80, at
6-12 (1976) (consequences of naming and labeling in legal doctrine); Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . ., 15 LAW & Soc'y
REv. 631 (1980-1981) (relationship between words and power in construction of disputes).
178. It may be more than indifference that must be shaken. As Richard Sennett has noted, "What
people are willing to believe is not simply a matter of the credibility or legitimacy of the ideas, rules,
and persons offered them. It is also a matter of their own need to believe." R. SENNET=, AUTHORrrY
25 (1980).
179. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1617-18 ("legal interpretation is a form of bonded
interpretation, bound at once to practical application (to the deeds it implies) and to the ecology of
jurisdictional roles (the conditions of effective domination)").
180. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 103, at 258-69.
181. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 204; see also M. WALZER, supra note 153, at 38-48
(interpretation as social criticism requiring membership).
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the British. This appeal alone could not constrain the British Empire, but
it helped support arguments for British self-restraint. Martin Luther
King could challenge racial segregation and white supremacy in buses,
schools, and public spaces, by joining the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People in its efforts to invoke the power of the Con-
stitution, the courts, and equal protection doctrine."8 2 The tradition repre-
sented by "equal protection" captured prior struggles to enlarge the
groups welcomed and included by the society. Those words, laden with
that history, remained open for investment with still more meanings of
inclusion. Previously, the legal rhetoric intoned by the civil rights activists
had been used to justify official power and even official violence and ex-
clusion."' 3 Loosened from its origins, however, rights rhetoric can wave as
a banner to lead assaults on official violence itself.
This tribute to rights rhetoric should not hide how official violence ex-
plained by judicial rhetoric does violence. But power, exercised in silence,
is even less likely to know restraint; for silence, while sometimes eloquent,
can seldom challenge power. Language, accompanying power, enables the
powerless to challenge power. Without language, and especially without
language recognized by the powerful, those who would challenge or resist
power are quite disabled.
Perhaps knowing this, the powerful sometimes use power to destroy
even the possibility of language. Violence and the Word draws on the
compelling interpretations of the silence induced by pain and torture in
Elaine Scarry's book, The Body in Pain."" Scarry describes, with words,
the pain that does "not simply resist language but actively destroys it,
bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to
the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned.' 85
But with her words about pain, Scarry breaks a silence and also shows
how silence is often produced by pain. By giving speech where there has
been silence, Scarry challenges the power that produces silence even about
silence.
In Violence and the Word Cover uses Scarry's language to launch his
own eloquent exploration of the field of pain and death where legal inter-
pretation takes place. This is not an abandonment of interpretation as an
enterprise or as a normative icon. Rather, he shows how the tools of lan-
182. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
183. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (approving detention of Japanese resi-
dents and American citizens of Japanese descent).
184. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1602-03 & nn.3-6 (citing E. SCARRY, THE BODY
IN PAIN 29, 56-58 (1985)). Scarry's book is self-consciously about "the way we make ourselves ...
available to one another through verbal and material artifacts" and "the making and unmaking of the
world." E. SCARRY, supra, at 22, 23.
185. E. SCARRY, supra note 184, at 4.
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guage and human gropings for meaning can be used to grasp portions of
the world usually beyond words. New kinds of violence committed by the
state initially elude words,""8 but new words about violence can disrupt
complacent conversations. Tactics to resist official violence, then, include
exposing in detail the disguises of power and the meanings of violence.
8 7
Law talk can be searing, and words may shake the world.
A related tactic is to elaborate the justifications that legal actors offer in
order to give those meanings bite for future critical use. One way to do
this is to speak of rights as interpretive terms in communal dialogue. Yet,
in maintaining this, I engage the two parts of this Essay not just in con-
versation-in a cozy talk-but in an angry disagreement. Violence and
the Word puts a fundamental challenge to the first section of this essay. If,
as I believe, Cover is right, and the violence inflicted by the judge threat-
ens to destroy normative ties between the judge and those before the court,
what, if anything, can be salvaged of the conception of community forged
through interpretive conversation in the language of rights? This question
gains additional significance when viewed through a wider lens, focusing
not just on the violence imposed by the judge, but also on the brutality
between litigants. Litigants use judicial power to inflict injury on one an-
other; the battle metaphor, despite Milner Ball's aspirations, 88 is often
quite apt for the experience of litigation. 8 9 Parties invoke the power of
the court to resolve disputes, much as children turn to their parents to
settle their disagreements with siblings or friends. Legal language, as the
interpretative turn suggests, translates but does not initiate conflict; yet the
translation can add to, subtract from, and even transform the meaning
arising from conflict. The conflicts predate the invocation of authority, but
the invocation of authority transforms the conflict, and threatens a new
source of coercion. 90 Nonetheless, a kind of community may develop even
in litigation: the community of the litigants before the law.
186. This may be because they are secret-secret bombings, unnamed secret weapons, secret nu-
clear arsenals-and perhaps because they are unfathomable.
187. Perhaps the point is that power, official or unofficial, can produce violence or meaning or
both, and the creation of ideological meanings that disguise violence confuses the matter. See P.
RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 12-15, 310-11 (G. Taylor ed. 1986) (discussing
legitimation and social identity produced by ideology). The work of Michel Foucault is devoted to
exposing patterns of power, disguised by entrenched social meanings. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, DiscI-
PLINE AND PUNISH (1971) (interpreting specific historical practices of social control and punishment);
M. FOUCAULT, POWFR/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 170, at 78-108 (explaining his methods and goals);
M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1978) (relating discussions of sex to social domina-
tion). This kind of interpretive work may assist resistance to official violence by exposing its subtle
workings.
188. See M. BALL, supra note 21, at 132-33.
189. See S. MILLER, THE GOOD MOTHER (1986) (novel detailing damage to mother and family
relationships inflicted during child custody litigation).
190. The meaning of judicial violence, however, may well be different in important ways when
one of the parties invoking judicial power is itself the state. Cover's Violence and the Word uses
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C. Who Is Before the Law?
Litigants, as well as judges, are engaged in rights rhetoric, and the nor-
mative dimension of this engagement warrants attention. One potential
meaning of judicial violence is its threat of punishment should a party
refuse to appear, argue, and submit to judgment. Coercion to participate
is certainly coercion. Its presence may well distort communication that
otherwise would occur. The alternative, however, may be silence, or con-
tinued conflict. Legal discourse does create a shared world within the
courtroom. Legal discourse converts the physical, economic, or psychologi-
cal conflict into verbal coinage with physical, economic, and psychological
dimensions. The significance of rights as tools of communal discourse, still
bonded to official violence, gains importance in this context.
What happens to litigants in court? The risk of judicial coercion re-
mains present throughout their exchange. But it is an indirect kind of
power, which the litigants themselves can wield. Litigants make claims on
the judge's power and demand that the opposing side participate in the
process.
Robert Cover's Violence and the Word primarily addresses the power
triggered by judges and the inevitable tie between this power and any
language of meaning the judge pronounces. Legal language used by par-
ties and their attorneys may carry quite different significancc- in their
lives. It may give voice to entitlements only dimly perceived before. It may
help each litigant recognize that there is another side to the story. Perhaps
the equality of legal discourse is effected less through equal participation
in the creation of legal meaning than through the shared experience of the
threat of judicial violence. Rather than comparing children in court to
adults, we might consider how litigation reduces all parties to children,
powerless but pleading before an imperfect authority. The risks posed by
legal violence can force litigants to reach new insights about what has
meaning for them, or what matters most. When King Solomon crudely
brandished a sword, he invited, or induced, some change in the self-
understandings of the two women in his court who fought over a child.
Rather than watch Solomon divide the child in half, one woman gave up
her claim to custody, and urged that his life be preserved; this change of
heart led Solomon to declare this woman the "true mother."' 1 Violence,
criminal law as the dominant focus, and therefore addresses those situations when the state's invoca-
tion of violence is most obvious and most severe.
191. Minow, The Judgment of Solomon and the Experience of Jusice, in THE STRUCrURE OF
PROCEDURE 447 (R. Cover & 0. Fiss eds. 1979). I wrote this essay for Bob Cover's seminar, "Myth,
Law, and History." I could not have written the piece without Bob's gentle but insistent encourage-
ment and belief that there was a paper there, amid my many retellings of the biblical story. The
assignment was to concentrate on the meaningfulness of concrete paradigms, by studying a specific
myth, elaborating layers of meaning in a specific event, or playing out a metaphoric elaboration of
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although not "justified" or "redeemed," created opportunities for norma-
tive growth, at least for the litigants."9 2
The experience of litigation may be too brutal and polarizing to serve
the purpose of encourgaging particular parties to join together in explor-
ing normative commitments through interpretation. Litigation may fore-
close rather than enable conversation. We have no hint that the women
facing Solomon learned to converse together as a result of their legal dis-
pute. Rights rhetoric, and the exploration of normative commitments
through conversation, could be more free of official violence for parties
who stay away from court and turn instead to settlement, mediation, or
planning long before litigation. 193 The creation of meaning through dis-
course may take place more fruitfully further away from the centers of
official power while still gaining from their shadows. 9
Rights rhetoric also may help to constitute a kind of communal author-
ity without need of official structures to command respect or occupy nor-
mative space.195 In whatever context, the language of rights and the nor-
mative community it signals may be critical in structuring a particular
kind of conversation. Through rights discourse, that conversation has
ground rules that alter the exchange-or the silence 6 -that would have
concepts in normative space. The challenge of that assignment is perhaps a life's work.
192. We have no reason to believe that Solomon himself was challenged to grow through this
experience; indeed, he may have grown more inured to the exercise of violence in the name of norma-
tive justification. Cf. B. BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE (J. Stern and T. Stern trans.
1983) (judge learns nothing from experience of resolving child custody dispute by having litigants
engage in tug of war over child and seems to enjoy infliction of abuse on litigants).
193. Whether mediation and other informal methods for dispute settlement provide contexts more
likely to promote authentic and meaningful speech-or instead are likely to introduce new forms of
coercion-is a subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Crouch, Mediation and Divorce: The Dark
Side Is Still Unexplored, 4 FAM. ADVOC. 27, 33 (1982) (mediation may produce exploitation of one
party); McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME.
L. REv. 237, 254-60 (1981) (reporting evidence that parties express greater satisfaction and compli-
ance with mediated settlements than with adjudicated judgments in small claims area); Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 754, 829-40 (1984) (discussing effects of inequalities of wealth, power, and strength of per-
sonality in negotiation); Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J.
CoMP. L. (Supp.) 205 (1978) (mediation can produce constructive process of mutual growth).
194. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (processes of divorce law create opportunities for private
orderings).
195. See The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 7, at 823-25 (discussing United
States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979), decided by Judge Herbert Stern as article
II judge for United States Court for occupied Berlin); Folktales ofJustice, supra note 25, at 191-97,
199-202 (exploring possibilities of tribunals without official authority to try United States for its role
in Vietnam War and to resolve disputes over rabbinic line affecting future of Messiah).
196. See S. GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE
(1981); Soifer, Listening and the Voiceless, 4 MIsS. C.L. REV. 319 (1984); see also Rich, Cartogra-
phies of Silence, in A. RICH, THE FACT OF A DOOR FRAME: POEMS SELECTED & NEW 1950-1984,
232, 233 (1984) ("Silence can be a plan /rigorously executed /the blueprint to a life /It is a presence
/it has a history a form /Do not confuse it /with any kind of absence").
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otherwise taken place.197 Judicial power may distort conversations, but
some conversations-both in and out of court-would never take place
without its threat.1 98
It is easier to build normative commitments by practicing interpretation
in private communities, distant from centers of state power and organized
violence, rather than in courts. Indeed, this theme was powerfully eluci-
dated by Cover in his 1983 Supreme Court Foreword, Nomos and Nar-
rative. 9 Dethroning the usually privileged official norms generated by
acts of state interpretation, that article celebrates the generation of norms
by small integral communities that often act in resistance to the state and
its organized power. For Cover, it was important to emphasize that the
state may attempt to destroy local, private normative activities because
they threaten to frustrate the state's thirst for a monopoly of meaning.200
This concern explains Bob Cover's frequent focus on questions of juris-
diction. This doctrine, invented by lawyers, organizes debate "over
whether and when law might be used to limit the powerful."201 Jurisdic-
tion is expressly about the relation between words and power.202
197. A similar point is made by those who worry about risks of shifting from formal adjudication
of legal matters involving poor or relatively powerless people; here arises the risk that the kind of
conversation that could have been instigated will not take place. See, e.g., Edley, Legal Reform and
the Poor: Some Questions, Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 1984, at All, col. 2:
No one has suggested that major antitrust suits or securities litigation be forced into binding
arbitration. Yet there is some danger that reformers will rush to push poor people out of the
traditional court system into uncertain, jury-rigged substitutes. . . .The disadvantages that
flow from having less income, sophistication and patience will still be real, even though the
game has changed from litigation to Let's Make A Deal. And if "informal" means that rules
and statutes can be bent in order to do what's "fair" in the specific dispute, what becomes of
whatever protections the less powerful party might have had from the rigid laws and
procedures?
198. In this country, legal discourse and judicial hearings may frame rituals when no other kinds
of communication are possible. Through ritual, communities express what goes to the essence of their
being. It is surely for such a reason that William Stafford named his poem, "A Ritual to Read to
Each Other":
If you don't know the kind of person I am /and I don't know the kind of person you are /a
pattern that others made may prevail in the world /and following the wrong god home we
may miss our star. . . .And as elephants parade holding each elephant's tail, /but if one
wanders the circus won't find the park, /I call it cruel and maybe the root of all cruelty /to
know what occurs but not recognize the fact.
W. STAFFORD, A Ritual To Read to Each Other, in STORIES THAT COULD BE TRUE 52 (1977).
199. Nomos and Narrative, supra note 23, at 4.
200. Compare Nomos and Narrative, supra note 23, at 11-19 (discussing "jurisgenerative" ca-
pacity of communities) with id. at 40-44 (describing "jurispathic" character of courts). Local commu-
nities may themselves commit violence, veiled or unveiled by interpretive acts. The racial discrimina-
tion of Bob Jones University, described in Nomos, is itself a kind of violence. See also W. SOyINKA,
DEATH AND THE KING'S HORSEMAN (1975) (portraying British attempt to prevent local ritual in
which horseman follows deceased king into world of ancestors).
201. Soifer, supra note 148, at 912.
202. See J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978). Vining begins with this meditation:
Jurisdiction is power. . . .With power a human being becomes a person. ...
Since the abandonment of absolutism no human being is all powerful, even in concept. He
has particular powers, and as these are defined he emerges as a particular person. The ques-
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Can words speak to power? How may normative language, which
makes the violence of the official order more palatable, ever constrain that
violence? Language is a thin shield and a fragile sword against actual
violence. Even if uncorrupted by its association with power and force,20 3
the normative language of rights discourse may simply fail to express the
desires and hopes of those who seek to curtail official violence. Legal lan-
guage is often inflexible and unwieldy, abstract and formal. Sometimes
people who win with legal language must face consequences they did not,
and would not, choose.20 4 The cumulative effect of legal discourse also
may be undesirable. Grant Gilmore warned that the pathway to hell is
paved with due process.
205
Moreover, legal language can never express individual experience. Its
very claim to communal meanings, its dependence directly and indirectly
on official sanctions, and its accreted past preclude that possibility.
2 6 I
tion What is a judge? can thus be replaced by the question When does a human being ap-
pointed judge have power?
Id. at 13-14. Vining turns to an imagined situation where the Secretary of the Interior is attending a
dinner party, and another guest orders him to suspend his decision to permit offshore oil drilling.
What difference does it make if this guest is a judge, and what devices determine the power of the
judge? Vining notes:
The secretary can appeal to others' sense of what a judge is and argue that the individual with
the commission, in his black robes and in his special room, was still not acting in the role of
the judge ...
If an individual who is not a judge wishes to challenge an act of the secretary's and persuade
a judge to issue an order to the secretary, he must bring the judge to see that a judge can
intervene in the situation. The secretary in turn will seek to show the judge that he cannot.
This is the jurisdictional argument that occurs in every case.
Id.
203. And this is a big "if." See, e.g., M. POLANY!, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 226-27 (1958):
We have seen that even though public power were originally based on terror, it could not fail
to supplement its coercive force by persuasion, and that the thoughts cultivated for the purpose
of controlling their people would inevitably gain ascendancy also to some degree over the rul-
ers' own behaviour....
[But] every new moral issue has evoked a clash of interests; how often moral progress had to
be forced upon the privileged by the pressure of the oppressed; how the existing distribution of
privilege has always granted its beneficiaries considerable powers to resist reforms that curtail
their advantage, and how they have perpetuated injustice by force. . . . We may still doubt,
therefore, whether the rulers of any society, however freely self-governed, will ever observe the
claims of morality beyond what is needed in order to delude their subjects (and their allies
abroad) to trust their professions of morality.
204. Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal Protection,
SIGNS 421 (Spring 1987) (effects on discrimination victims of pursuing rights enforcement).
205. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977) ("In hell there will be nothing but
law, and due process will be meticulously observed.").
206. The particular shape of legal rhetoric may be inhospitable to certain meanings, while wel-
coming to others.
Rights language offers a rich vernacular for the claims an individual may make on or against
the collectivity, but it is relatively impoverished as a means of expressing individuals' needs for
the collectivity. ...
It is because money cannot buy the human gestures which confer respect, nor rights guaran-
tee them as entitlements, that any decent society requires a public discourse about the needs of
the human person.
M. IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 13 (1984).
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have criticized rights rhetoric for its impoverished view of human relation-
ships and its repeated assignment of labels that hide the power of those
doing the assigning.20 7 And I find something terribly lacking in rights for
children that speak only of autonomy rather than need, especially the cen-
tral need for relationships with adults who are themselves enabled to cre-
ate settings where children can thrive.208
As Cover reminded us, even the communal dimensions of rights claims
are connected to violence. The assertion of community may be false, or
may create a new line of exclusion enforceable by police power. Rights
rhetoric can, and should, be exposed for its tendency to hide the exercise
of state authority, even when exercised in the name of private freedoms.
Rights discourse, like any language, may mislead, seduce, falsely console
or wrongly inflame.
Nonetheless, I worry about criticizing rights and legal language just
when they have become available to people who had previously lacked
access to them. I worry about those who have, telling those who do not,
"you do not need it, you should not want it." But, rather than trash
rights, I join in the efforts to reclaim and reinvent them. Whether and
how to use words to constrain power are questions that should be an-
swered by those who lack it. For this task, rights rhetoric is remarkably
well-suited. It enables a devastating, if rhetorical, exposure of and chal-
lenge to hierarchies of power. In Patricia Williams' words, people using
the language of rights "imply a respect which places one in the referential
range of self and others, which elevates one's status from human body to
social being."209 The ambiguity and mutability of the words allow those
who use them to shape and reinvent their meanings.210
Elizabeth Schneider has articulated how lawyers and parties, drawing
upon their own experiences, can struggle to bring new meaning to legal
rules, and how they can appeal to legal officials to give force to those
meanings.21 ' Legal vocabulary, including rights, can be invested with
meanings that challenge power and violence. Legal language, limited and
partial as it is, can become a powerful medium for struggle. Each historic
struggle has helped to transform inherited meanings. 2 12 For the speaker,
207. Minow, When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 15, at 127-30, 168-89.
208. Minow, Rights for the Next Generation, supra note 30, at 23.
209. Williams, supra note 59, at 416; see also Note, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of
Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569 (1987) (exploring how right to petition government for redress of griev-
ances can empower individuals and groups).
210. Much of the first part of this essay is an effort to recover the relational aspect of a rights
discourse that has so often emphasized autonomous individualism.
211. Schneider, supra note 85, at 604-10 (discussing feminist lawyer's effort to shape new politi-
cal and legal meanings from her experience).
212. See generally Symposium: Sounds of Silence, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming
1987).
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an inherited language is less a collection of pre-ordained meanings than
(Ca means of transgressing factual constellations in the direction of an un-
charted future."2 ' As a bridge between the world-that-is and alternative
worlds-that-might-be, legal norms cannot belong exclusively to any state
or set of officials. Those without official roles are as important to bridge
present and future. Everyone can demand justification for every act of
violence, committed against the state, or away from the state, or in the
name of the state.214
III. AFTER THE LAW: INTERPRETING RIGHTS
And so I appeal to a voice, to something shadowy,/ a remote impor-
tant region in all who talk: I though we could fool each other, we
should consider- / lest the parade of our mutual life get lost in the
dark.
-William Stafford215
I have the luxury, as a scholar, to criticize. I can step back and criticize
basic tools of legal practice, like rights, for preserving assumptions about
human autonomy that I believe are contrary to social experience and
likely to limit social change. Yet when I write a brief, supervise students
in their clinical work, or talk to professionals in the trenches, I wonder
sometimes whom I am helping and whom I am hurting by criticizing
rights. It turns out to be helpful, useful, and maybe even essential, to be
able to couch a request as a claim of right. By "helpful, useful, and maybe
even essential," I mean not just in terms of winning a given case or con-
vincing a particular official to do a good thing, but in helping to constitute
the kind of world where struggles for change can in fact bring about
change, and where struggles for meaning and communality can nurture
both.
Rights can be understood as a kind of communal discourse that recon-
firms the difficult commitment to live together even while engaging in
conflicts and struggles. The struggle to make meaning of human existence
may well demand our separation into groups away from, even antagonis-
tic to, the larger community. If this is the case, then the discourse of rights
may be all the more important as a medium for speaking across conflict-
ing affiliations, about the separations and connections among individuals,
groups, and the state. The very act of summoning "community," through
213. F. DALLMAYR, supra note 106, at 97 (discussing J.P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
(1956)).
214. Folktales of Justice, supra note 25, at 181-82.
215. W. STAFFORD, supra note 199, at 52.
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a language of rights, may expose the divisions within the commu-
nity-and even beyond it.
Legal interpretation, at such moments, happens not just in official acts
by official actors. Legal interpretation also occurs through resistance, com-
pliance, and investment of old forms with new meanings. Legal interpre-
tation happens when non-officials seek to hold officials to account, either
in terms the officials themselves have offered as rationales or in new
terms, embodying normative commitments that have not before made their
way into the official canon of meaning. Legal language is never transpar-
ent to experience; it constrains and limits what individuals mean even as it
conveys a communal meaning. And the communal meaning may well oc-
clude the conflict it resists. Legal meanings pronounced by officials cannot
be severed from the violence and power they seek to rationalize; nor can
they be reduced to those acts of violence and power. Because private vio-
lence can be as bad as official vioience, both public and private efforts to
craft legal meanings and normative commitments are important for strug-
gling against oppression.
What happens after the law, after official legal pronouncements, good
or bad? The interpretive framework suggests that legal pronouncements
are possessions of the dispossessed.2"' We can listen to rights as a lan-
guage that contains meaning but does not engender it, as sounds that
demonstrate our sociability even while exposing the uniqueness of the
speaker. Legal language, like a song, can be hummed by someone who did
not write it and chanted by those for whom it was not intended.
2 17
Language is nuanced enough to express, "No, that's not what I meant,"
or even, "There are no words to say what I mean." The language of
rights is, or could be, nuanced enough to express, "I am connected to you
in my very willingness to observe your boundaries," or "I do not belong to
216. Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 73 J. AM. HIST. (forth-
coming 1987) (noting how others describe constitutional interpretation as battle among heirs to found-
ing fathers, and offering instead conception of battle among disinherited).
217. Hanna Pitkin has suggested that a tension between ideals and institutional practices may
actually create the opportunity for a critical leverage on each: She writes:
The tension may arise through either of two possible historical sequences. Perhaps men con-
ceive some ideal or goal or purpose, and develop an institution or a set of procedures for
achieving and perpetuating that goal through time and in the activities of many men. They
draw up a set of laws, or institute a school, or create a new agency. But rules require interpre-
tation, and institutions have a way of developing purposes and directions of their own. After a
time, men may find themselves torn between their commitment to the original purpose, and
their commitment to the institutions that were supposed to bring it about. Or, conversely, a
society may gradually and without any deliberate intent develop certain institutionalized or
ritual ways of proceeding, and from these it may eventually abstract rules or principles or
ideals. At first these rules or ideals may be merely descriptive abstractions of how the institu-
tion works, but after a time they become critical standards in accord with which the institution
can be evaluated and reformed. Again the result is a tension between the "ideal substance" and
the "practical form" in which it is embodied.
H. PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 187 (1972).
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your community, with your norms, but I lay claim to some shared terms
in demanding that you respect my separateness."21 Perhaps people can
work through legal interpretation to communicate disjunction, misunder-
standing, even the right to avoid conversation. After the law, we have each
other, and the steady burden of learning to live together and apart.
In a seminar entitled "Myth, Law, and History," in the fall of 1977,
Robert Cover introduced Yale law students to myths and histories about
the creation of law and about central legal preoccupations, such as guilt
and innocence. The theme of creation launched a journey through biblical
and Talmudic texts, through American constitutional history, and through
studies of the law-giver, Moses.219
Theh, the discussion turned to the Oresteia. Here was a world of divine
chaos. Blood-feuds, once started, have no end. Human beings are the hap-
less victims of the gods' intervention. Aeschylus transforms a well-known
story into a sharp dilemma about the relations between justice and vio-
lence, and between conflicting normative commitments.
The House of Pelops is cursed. Conspirators murder Agamemnon upon
his return from the Trojan Wars. Apollo commands Orestes to avenge his
218. See Levinson, Professing Law: Commitment of Faith or Detached Analysis?, 31 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 3 (1986) (discussing loyalty oaths). Elsewhere, I have written about this power in poetry:
Feelings of powerlessness may at times preclude speech, even speech about powerlessness. In
this context, I am reminded of a poem so expressive of the difficulties in finding words that it
conveys silence even as it speaks.
The poet W. S. Merwin wrote this short, abrupt verse, entitled: "Elegy":
Who would I show it to
Ending with a preposition, in mid-thought; ending without punctuation, and relying on refer-
ence without definition; stand-in words like "who," "I," and "it" for undisclosed references:
the poem is perplexing. Incompletion and dependence on what remains forever unsaid weigh
heavily in the poem, and at least in some measure, may be its message. Yet, probing for some
more specific meaning, the reader could try to relate to the text and draw from the reader's
own experience. "Why such incompletion?" the reader can ask. What could be the "it" in the
poem-perhaps the elegy in the title. The "I"-perhaps the poet. The "who"-perhaps no
one known, no one alive. Perhaps the poem means the poet's relationship with someone has
been so interrupted, so cutoff, perhaps by death, that the very idea of memorializing the lost
one seems futile. The one person who could understand and appreciate the poet's efforts to
write an elegy is gone. The possibility of mourning that could reach closure is so dim that the
poet cannot even complete the thought about how to try.
And yet, if any of this discussion echoes the meanings the author intended or meanings
sensed by readers other than me, another twist in the meaning remains. If I am able to grasp
some portion of the poet's thought and feeling, some sense of how great would be the poet's
grief, loss, and interruption that produces such a statement of the impossibility of statement,
then indeed the poet has communicated. And the silence, between strangers, between author
and reader, has indeed been broken. Conversation where there has been silence may best begin
this way, in expressions of what has been and perhaps remains inexpressible.
Minow, Many Silent Worlds, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 197, 204-05 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
219. The readings brought together three works about Moses, each by a German writing in the
1930's. See M. BUBER, MOSES (1946); S. FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM (1939); T. MANN, The
Tables of the Law, in 2 STORIES OF A LIFETIME 288 (1961).
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father, Agamemnon, by murdering his mother, who herself had planned
Agamemnon's death. Pursued by the Furies for the act of matricide, Ores-
tes is inextricably caught between clashing moral imperatives. Apollo di-
rects Orestes to appeal to Athena, because she combines male and female
virtues, and embodies the virtues of moderation, restraint, and persuasion.
Yet, as Athena knows, the gods are divided, so there can be no direct
appeal to their authority. She chooses ten mortal men of Athens to act as a
jury of peers.220 The gods, though, will make the jury's judgment su-
preme. When the jury casts its lots, they come out evenly, and Athena
casts the deciding vote. She pardons Orestes, but her decision topples the
prevailing divine legal order. Mercy does violence to law. Athena has
challenged the power of the Furies by excusing Orestes from their
charges; she has dislodged the divine order by appointing a jury of
mortals. Responding to the angered Furies, Athena interprets the jury
vote: You have not lost, she says, for the vote was even. Athena proposes
that the Furies, the Olympian gods, and men will share control of the
legal order, and indeed, share sovereignty in the minds of humanity. With
a new role-to punish those who offend the due processes of law-the
Furies are transformed, and become the Eumenides, the "Kindly Ones."
Sky and earth, eagle and snake, freedom and necessity, the new order and
the old-all are joined in a new iteration of the continual struggle.
There was a moment in the class when Bob Cover conjured up the
closing choice reached by the gods to create a public sphere, beyond the
conflicts of blood feuds. It was a choice to turn the instruments of justice
over to humans beings. It was a moment of hope and a moment of neces-
sity. We gained the right to interpret our own meanings, and pursue our
own justice, though we remain tragically caught in ignorance and violence
as we compete for the power to give reality to our visions.
[A]s long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as
well as meaning, as long as people are committed to using or re-
sisting the social organizations of violence in making their interpreta-
tions real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning
that can be achieved.221
220. Athena charges the human jury to retain a sense of fear even while engaging in self-
governance:
No anarchy, no rule of a single master. Thus/I advise my citizens to govern and to grace,/and
not to cast fear utterly from your city. What/man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous?
Such/be your just terrors, and you may deserve and have/salvation for your citadel, your
land's defence,/such as is nowhere else found among men, neither/among the Scythians, nor
the land that Pelops held.
Aeschylus, Eumenides 160 (R. Lattimore trans. 1953) (lines 698-705).
221. Violence and the Word, supra note 7, at 1629.
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Interpreting Rights
May we learn to interpret our suffering; may we recover our rights to
make meaning.
1915
